United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE/INABILITY TO STATE A
CLAIM (DOC. 22) TWENTY-ONE (21) DAY DEADLINE
K. OBERTO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Tavare Monroe Grant, a state prisoner proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on
incidents that occurred while he was a state prisoner housed
at the California State Prison in Corcoran, California
(“CSP-Cor”). Plaintiff filed the Complaint in
this action on March 15, 2016. (Doc. 1.) It was screened and
dismissed with leave to amend. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint is now before the Court for
screening. (Doc. 22.)
Screening Requirement and Standard
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or
any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . .
. the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil
actions, with limited exceptions, ” none of which
applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .
. ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must
simply give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff
must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its
face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations are
accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S.
Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009);
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
"plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings
facts . . ., " Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d
949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners
are still construed liberally and are afforded the benefit of
any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th
Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal pleading standard . .
. applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations,
" Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9
(1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights
complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that
were not initially pled, " Bruns v. Nat'l Credit
Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)
quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268
(9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge
unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal- Mart
Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that
are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability” fall short of satisfying the plausibility
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572
F.3d at 969.
Linkage and Causation
1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of
Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by
persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v.
Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long
v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of
substantive rights, but merely provides a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”
Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec'y of State,
678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim,
Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a
link, or causal connection, between each defendant's
actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights.
Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehab.,
726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v.
Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011).
allegations do not demonstrate that each defendant personally
participated in the deprivation of his rights, Jones v.
Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002), as they are
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere
possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this
plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
is currently incarcerated at California State Prison in
Sacramento, California (“CSP-Sac”), but his
allegations are based on circumstances that allegedly
occurred at the California State Prison
(“CSP-Cor”), in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff
names the following prison staff as Defendants: Senior