United States District Court, S.D. California
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff,
PC IRON, INC., Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION TO INTERVENE [DOC. NO. 12]
ANN BENCIVENGO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff-Intervenor Elsa
Perez's (“Ms. Perez”) motion for leave to
intervene. [Doc. No. 12.] The Court finds the matter suitable
for determination on the papers submitted in accordance with
Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and therefore denies
Defendant's request for oral argument [Doc. No. 17]. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion.
September 21, 2016, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC” or the
“Commission”), in its capacity as the federal
agency charged with the interpretation, administration, and
enforcement of federal statutes banning employment
discrimination, filed a complaint alleging Defendant engaged
in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 102 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. [Doc. No. 1.] In the complaint, Ms. Perez
is identified as the Charging Party whose allegations provide
the basis of the EEOC's action. [Id.]
December 15, 2016, the EEOC filed an amended complaint
alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991(“Title
VII”) to correct Defendant's alleged unlawful
employment practices on the basis of sex and to provide
appropriate relief to Charging Party Perez. [Doc. No. 5.]
August 1, 2017 Ms. Perez filed her motion seeking to
intervene in this action as of right because she has a
significant interest in the underlying action. [Doc. No. 12.]
On August 3, 2017, the EEOC filed a notice of non-opposition.
[Doc. No. 13.] Defendant filed its response in opposition
[Doc. No. 14] and Ms. Perez filed her reply [Doc. No. 16]. On
August 30, 2017, Defendant filed a request for oral argument
on the motion for leave to intervene. [Doc. No. 17.] On the
same day, Ms. Perez filed a response to the request for oral
argument. [Doc. No. 18.]
Perez seeks to intervene in this action as of right claiming
she has a significant interest in the underlying action.
[Doc. No. 12.] Further, Ms. Perez asserts that the
substantial overlap in the evidence needed to prove both the
Title VII and her individual state law claims provides
additional grounds for the Court to invoke its supplemental
jurisdiction. [Id. at 2.] Ms. Perez wishes to pursue
her remedies for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
injunctive relief under Title VII and the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) claims.
Defendant opposes the intervention on the grounds that it is
untimely, would cause it substantial prejudice and Ms.
Perez's rights are adequately represented by the EEOC.
[Doc. No. 14.] Defendant's response in opposition focuses
solely on Ms. Perez's intervention as of right argument
and is silent regarding her supplemental jurisdiction
Intervention as of Right
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides “(a)
Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must
permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is given an unconditional
right to intervene by federal statute. . . .” Title
VII, as amended, expressly provides that the person aggrieved
by a violation of Title VII shall have the right to intervene
in a civil action brought by the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) (“The person or persons aggrieved shall
have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the
Commission or the Attorney General in a case involving a
government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision.”) See also EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 675 F.2d 164, 165 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v.
ABM Industries, Inc., 249 FRD 588, 590 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
the parties do not dispute that Ms. Perez is an aggrieved
person because she filed the charge upon which the EEOC's
lawsuit is based. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002) (“If . . . the EEOC files suit
on its own, the employee . . . may intervene in the
EEOC's suit.”). Thus, Ms. Perez has the right to
determining whether the application to intervene has been
timely requested a court should broadly construe the
requirements of Rule 24 in favor of the moving party. Sw.
Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810,
818 (9th Cir. 2001). Factors to consider include: (1) the
stage of the proceedings; (2) the reason for any delay in
moving to intervene; and (3) whether the parties would be
prejudiced. Nw. Forest Resource Council v. Glickman,
82 F.3d 825, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1996). “[T]he timeliness
requirement for intervention as of right should be treated
more leniently than for permissive intervention because of
the likelihood of harm.” U.S. v. State of Or.,
745 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984).
procedural posture of this case does not weigh against
granting the application to intervene. It is two months prior
to the close of fact discovery and over ten months to the
July 20, 2018 trial date. [See Doc. No. 11.]
the second factor, timeliness, the parties dispute whether or
not the motion to intervene has been brought in a timely
manner. Defendant asserts that Ms. Perez has not provided
adequate justification for her delay, has been aware of this
action since she filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC on August 24, 2012, has been actively involved in this
case and was aware of the deadline to intervene, and the
delay in moving to intervene was caused by her own lack of
diligence. The Court does not agree with Defendant's
position. Although a year has elapsed since the filing of
this complaint, the Court does not find this a dispositive
factor in determining the timeliness of the motion. See
U.S. v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“Mere lapse of time is not determinative”). The