California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division
In re CHARLES G., a Person coming under the Juvenile Court Law.
CHARLES G., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
modifying published opinion filed 8/25/17
Court Contra Costa County No. J1501141 Hon. John T. Laettner
M. Weyand, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, Joan Killeen and Amit Kurlekar, Deputy Attorneys
General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MODIFYING OPINION [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
ordered that the published opinion filed herein on August 25,
2017, be modified as follows:
on the first line of page 3, the phrase, “We reject
Charles's claim for a simple reason passed over by the
parties:” is modified to delete “passed over by
the parties.” The phrase shall read, “We reject
Charles's claim for a simple reason:”.
is no change in the judgment.
G. appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdictional order
in a Welfare and Institutions section 602 proceeding. Charles
argues that we should reverse the court's finding that he
carried a concealed firearm in violation of Penal Code
section 25400 as unlawful because that statute is
preempted by a more specific statute that targets minors,
section 29610, which the court also found he violated.
Charles also argues there was insufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court's finding that he willfully
resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer in that
officer's discharge of his duties in violation of section
disagree that section 29610 preempts section 25400. We
conclude the statutes prohibit different conduct and affirm
the juvenile court's findings that Charles violated both
statutes. We agree with Charles that there was insufficient
evidence that he violated section 148 and therefore reverse
this part of the court's ruling.
December 2015, the Contra Costa County District Attorney
filed a petition alleging Charles committed a felony
violation of section 29610 for possession of a firearm by a
minor; a felony violation of section 25400, subdivision
(a)(2) for having a concealed firearm on his person; and a
misdemeanor violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1) for
resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace officer in that
officer's performance of his duties.
August 2016, the juvenile court commenced a hearing regarding
Charles's motion to suppress evidence under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 700.1 and regarding jurisdiction.
The court denied the section 700.1 motion and sustained all
three counts, but subsequently granted Charles's motion
to reduce the two firearm felony violations to misdemeanors.
At a subsequent disposition hearing, the court committed
Charles to Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility for a
six-month regular program.
subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.
29610 Does Not Preempt Section 25400, Subdivision
first argues the juvenile court improperly found he violated
both section 25400, subdivision (a)(2), which prohibits a
person from carrying a concealed firearm, and section 29610,
which prohibits a minor from possessing a firearm capable of
concealment on his or her person. He contends the juvenile
court should have found he violated section 29610 only
because it is the more specific statute and, therefore,
preempts section 25400, subdivision (a)(2). The People
agree with Charles that the statutes involve the same
conduct, but argue that section 29610 does not preempt
section 25400 because it does not prescribe lesser
punishment. We do not further consider the parties'
debate on this issue. We reject Charles's claim for a
simple reason passed over by the parties: a violation of
section 29610 is not necessarily or commonly a violation of
section 25400, subdivision (a)(2) and, therefore, section
29610 does not preempt section 25400, subdivision (a)(2).
General Legal Standards
‘Questions of statutory interpretation are, of course,
pure matters of law upon which we may exercise our
independent judgment.' ” (In re Tobacco II
Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 311.) “[I]f a general
statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the
court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be
prosecuted exclusively under the special statute.”
(People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86
(Murphy).) This “Williamson rule,
” first formulated in In re Williamson (1954)
43 Cal.2d 651, 654 (Williamson), is a rule of
judicial interpretation that is designed to “
‘ascertain and carry out legislative intent. The fact
that the Legislature has enacted a specific statute covering
much the same ground as a more general law is a powerful
indication that the Legislature intended the specific
provision alone to apply.' ” (Murphy, at
Williamson rule is triggered “when ‘it
appears from the statutory context that a violation of the
special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a
violation of the general statute.' ”
(Murphy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 86.) On
the other hand, we do not assume the Legislature intended to
preclude prosecution under the general statute if it
“contains an element that is not contained in the