Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Monet v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division

September 5, 2017

CHRIS MONET, Plaintiff,
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et al., Defendants.

          ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART JPMORGAN CHASE'S MOTION TO DISMISS RE: DKT. NO. 10

          LUCY H. KOH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Plaintiff Chris Monet (“Monet”) sues Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and Quality Loan Service Corporation (“QLS”) (collectively, “Defendants”), for causes of action arising out of Defendants' initiation of foreclosure on Plaintiff's home. See ECF No. 1-1 (First Amended Complaint, or “FAC”). Before the Court is Chase's motion to dismiss. ECF No. 10. The Court finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument and accordingly VACATES the motion hearing set for September 7, 2017. Having considered the parties' submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Chase's motion to dismiss.

         I. BACKGROUND

         A. Factual Background

         Plaintiff financed the real property at 1228 Naglee Avenue in San Jose, California (“the Property”), through a loan secured by a Deed of Trust. See FAC ¶¶ 1, 16. Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that Plaintiff financed the Property on October 2, 2002, and Plaintiff's FAC incorporates by reference the Deed of Trust, which is attached to Plaintiff's FAC as Exhibit A. See Id. ¶ 16. However, the October 2, 2002 Deed of Trust attached to Plaintiff's FAC names only Neil J. Evans as borrower, and Fremont Investment & Loan as lender. See id., Ex. A. The October 2, 2002 Deed of Trust does not mention Plaintiff. See Id. Accordingly, it is unclear from Plaintiff's FAC when Plaintiff came into possession of the Property, and when Plaintiff became a borrower on the loan.

         According to the FAC, “[o]n or about October 2, 2015, Chase caused [QLS] to record a Notice of Default and Election to Sell under Deed of Trust” against the Property (hereinafter, the “Notice of Default”). Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff's FAC attaches and incorporates by reference the October 2, 2015 Notice of Default. Id. The attached Notice of Default names Plaintiff as borrower on the Deed of Trust, names SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., as the lender, and provides September 5, 2007 as the date of recordation of the Deed of Trust. Id., Ex. B. Accordingly, the Notice of Default attached to Plaintiff's FAC contradicts Plaintiff's allegation in his FAC that Plaintiff financed the property on October 2, 2002. Id. Again, it is unclear from Plaintiff's allegations and attached exhibits when Plaintiff came into possession of the Property, and when Plaintiff became a borrower on the loan.

         The FAC does not provide any further factual allegations regarding the status of Plaintiff's foreclosure. However, Plaintiff alleges that he is still residing at the Property. See Id. ¶ 1.

         B. Procedural History

         On December 18, 2015, Plaintiff sued Defendants in Santa Clara Superior Court. See ECF No. 11 (Request for Judicial Notice, or “RJN”), Ex. A (“Compl.”).[1] Plaintiff alleged six causes of action against Defendants: (1) violation of California Civil Code § 2923.17(b)(a); (2) violation of California Civil Code § 2923.6; (3) violation of California Civil Code § 2924.11(a); (4) violation of California Civil Code § 2923.7; (5) injunctive relief pursuant to California Civil Code § 2924.12(a); and (6) violation of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200.

         Plaintiff's original state court complaint alleged that, since 2002, Plaintiff “made any and all payments to the Defendants in a timely manner, ” and that Plaintiff kept his loan current until early 2014. See Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleged that, in September 2014, Plaintiff contacted Chase to seek “an explanation of an overcharged impound account.” Id. Plaintiff alleged that he asked Chase on several occasions for clarification regarding “how, when and why Plaintiff's loan was an impound account and in an alleged state of default, ” but Chase failed to provide an adequate explanation to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 18.

         On January 22, 2016, Chase removed the action to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Case No. 16-CV-00372-LHK (“Monet I”), ECF No. 1. On January 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand, which Chase opposed on February 12, 2016. See Monet I, ECF Nos. 15 & 17. Plaintiff did not file a reply.

         On March 14, 2016, this Court granted Plaintiff's motion to remand. Monet I, ECF No. 23. Specifically, the Court found that there was not complete diversity between the parties because Plaintiff and Defendant QLS were both California citizens. Id. at 5.

         On January 3, 2017, after the case was remanded to Santa Clara Superior Court, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). See FAC. Significantly, Plaintiff removed from the FAC the factual allegations regarding Plaintiff's attempts to contact Chase regarding Plaintiff's alleged overcharged impound account. Id. Instead, Plaintiff's FAC alleges only general facts about the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”), in addition to laws that prohibit “dual tracking.” See Id. ¶¶ 11-13. The only specific factual allegations in Plaintiff's FAC are that Plaintiff financed the Property on October 2, 2002-which, as set forth above, is contradicted by the Deed of Trust attached to the FAC-and that Chase caused the Notice of Default to be recorded against the Property on October 2, 2015. See FAC ¶¶ 1, 17. Plaintiff's FAC alleges the following causes of action against Defendants: (1) violation of California Civil Code § 2923.6; (2) violation of California Civil Code § 2923.7; (3) violation of California Civil Code § 2924.17; (4) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2605, 2609; (5) violation of the UCL. See id.

         On February 7, 2017, Chase removed the FAC to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. See ECF No. 1. Unlike Chase's removal of the original complaint, which was based on diversity jurisdiction, Chase's February 7, 2017 removal of the FAC was based on federal question jurisdiction because Plaintiff added to the FAC a cause of action under RESPA. See id. The instant case was assigned to United States District Judge Beth Freeman. See ECF No. 8.

         On February 14, 2017, Chase filed a motion to dismiss the FAC. ECF No. 10 (“Mot.”). Chase also filed a request for judicial notice. See RJN. On February 28, 2017, Plaintiff opposed Chase's motion. ECF No. 15 (“Opp.”). On March 7, 2017, Chase filed a Reply. ECF No. 16 (“Reply”).

         On July 13, 2017, Judge Freeman issued a referral for the purpose of determining the relationship of this case to Monet I. See ECF No. 17. On July 13, 2017, the undersigned judge issued an order relating the instant case to Monet I. Id. Accordingly, the instant case was reassigned to the undersigned judge on July 14, 2017. ECF No. 19.

         Defendant QLS has not appeared in this matter.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         A. Motion to Dismiss ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.