United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND (DOC. 10)
JENNIFER L. THURSTON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
brings this action alleging that his transfer to Pleasant
Valley State Prison violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment since he subsequently contracted Valley Fever. As
discussed below, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim
upon which relief may be granted. Since he was previously
provided the applicable standards and leave to amend his
pleading, the First Amended Complaint is
DISMISSED and Plaintiff is given opportunity
to cure the deficiencies in his pleading.
Screening Requirement and Standard
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or
any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . .
. the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil
actions, with limited exceptions, ” none of which
applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .
. . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). “Such a statement
must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
of Rule 8, at both ends of the spectrum, warrant dismissal. A
violation occurs when a pleading says too little __ the
baseline threshold of factual and legal allegations required
was the central issue in the Iqbal line of cases.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129
S.Ct. 1937 (2009). The Rule is also violated, though, when a
pleading says too much. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v.
Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th
Cir.2011) (“[W]e have never held __ and we know of no
authority supporting the proposition __ that a pleading may
be of unlimited length and opacity. Our cases instruct
otherwise.”) (citing cases); see also McHenry v.
Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir.1996) (affirming a
dismissal under Rule 8, and recognizing that “[p]rolix,
confusing complaints such as the ones plaintiffs filed in
this case impose unfair burdens on litigants and
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff
must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its
face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations are
accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S.
Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009);
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
“plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings
facts . . ., ” Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d
949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners
are still construed liberally and are afforded the benefit of
any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th
Cir. 2010). However, “the liberal pleading standard . .
. applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations,
” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9
(1989), “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights
complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that
were not initially pled, ” Bruns v. Nat'l
Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)
quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268
(9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge
unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The “sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is
not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely
consistent with' a defendant's liability” fall
short of satisfying the plausibility standard.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
“repeated and knowing violations of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)'s ‘short and plain
statement' requirement are strikes as ‘fail[ures]
to state a claim, ' 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), when the
opportunity to correct the pleadings has been afforded and
there has been no modification within a reasonable
time.” Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1108-09
(9th Cir. 2013). If he chooses to file a second amended
complaint, Plaintiff should make it as concise as possible
and simply state which of his constitutional rights he
believes were violated by each Defendant and the factual
basis. Plaintiff need not and should not cite legal authority
for his claims as his factual allegations are accepted as
Linkage and Causation
1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of
Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by
persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v.
Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long
v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of
substantive rights, but merely provides a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”
Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec'y of State,
678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim,
Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a
link, or causal connection, between each defendant's
actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights.
Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehab.,
726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v.
Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011).
fails to link Chief Sup Executive T. Clarke to any of his
factual allegations. Plaintiff's allegations must
demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in
the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams,
297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the
presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962,
969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls
short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Prisoners
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are
entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to
have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe, 627
F.3d at 342.