United States District Court, N.D. California
ALIVIA J. STRICKLIN, Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 RE: DKT. NO. 1
C. SPERO, CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Alivia J. Stricklin, pro se, brings this action naming the
United States of America, the Department of the Navy, the
NASA Ames Research Center, and Jack Henry Glazer as
defendants. The Court previously granted Stricklin's
application to proceed in forma pauperis and now reviews the
sufficiency of her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons discussed below, the complaint
is hereby DISMISSED with leave to amend. Stricklin may file
an amended complaint no later than December 5,
case management conference previously scheduled for November
17, 2017 is CONTINUED to January 26, 2018 at 2:00
PM in Courtroom G of the federal courthouse at 450
Golden Gate Avenue in San Francisco, California.
plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1) and is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims which:
(1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); see Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495
(9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that a pleading must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint that
lacks such statement fails to state a claim and must be
determining whether a plaintiff fails to state a claim, the
court assumes that all factual allegations in the complaint
are true. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d
1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). However, “the tenet that a
court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is
inapplicable to legal conclusions [and] mere conclusory
statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The pertinent question is whether the
factual allegations, assumed to be true, “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Thus, to meet
this requirement, the complaint must be supported by factual
the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, as is the
case here, courts must “construe the pleadings
liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any
doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342
(9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “A district court
should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend
unless 'it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of
the complaint could not be cured by amendment.'”
Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202,
1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). Further, when it
dismisses the complaint of a pro se litigant with leave to
amend, “the district court must provide the litigant
with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to
ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend
effectively.” Id. (quoting Ferdik v.
Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).
“Without the benefit of a statement of deficiencies,
the pro se litigant will likely repeat previous
errors.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police
Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.
complaint is difficult to follow. It includes conclusory
references to, for example, “social security
misuse” and “recording of private communications,
” Compl. (dkt. 1) ¶ 7, stalking, id.
¶ 9, the right to contract, id. ¶ 13,
hazing, id. ¶ 16, rules of conduct for
government attorneys, id. ¶ 21, and the
Violence Against Women Act, id. ¶ 29. It is not
clear how the limited factual allegations included
in the complaint relate to those theories or to each other.
Such allegations range from an incident in 1979 in which
Defendant Glazer allegedly took Stricklin to a remote
location in San Francisco, id. ¶ 2, to mail
being taken from a mailbox, id. ¶ 9, to
Stricklin purchasing a “space pen” in Berkeley
and a box of chocolates in Vallejo, id. ¶ 11,
to Stricklin receiving a telephone call in Illinois from a
young child several weeks after she had dreamt about a child
being carried into a building in San Francisco, id.
¶ 25, to Glazer's alleged history of “nine or
ten plus marriages, ” id. at 27.
example, the paragraph of the complaint addressing the 1979
incident in San Francisco reads as follows:
Late Fall of 1979, Defendant's Agent Mr. Jack Henry
Glazer ask if I could attend a military reception? I
confirmed yes (set on meeting other USNR). The
Defendant's officer and agent “neglected to respect
his “military” position, ” mislead other
military officers under his leadership by designing a
“ceremonial hazing.” Three officers who were
invited show-up (dressed blue” ties and spit shined
shoes). The Navy Officers acted negligently, carelessly,
and/or unlawfully in the course and scope of their military
statuses. Four men taking a woman to the edge of San
Francisco, ocean across highway (three bagpipers and
instruments?). Dry yellow bushes/brush over everyone's
head dead bottles and cans (perfect scenario for
assault/abuse). Within a few minutes a “camera showed
up” in the hand of the Defendants, Officer Mr. Jack
Id. ¶ 2 (sic throughout; ellipsis in original).
Although this is one of Stricklin's more specific factual
allegations in comparison to the rest of the complaint, it is
not clear what Stricklin alleges actually happened during the
1979 incident or how it relates to any theory of liability.
construing Stricklin's allegations liberally, the Court
cannot discern any set of facts in the complaint supporting a
plausible claim for relief. The complaint is therefore
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. If
Stricklin wishes to pursue this action, she may file an
amended complaint that, first, clearly and plainly sets forth
all of the facts ...