United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER: 1) DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
[ECF No. 2] AND 2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION AS FRIVOLOUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)
LARRY ALAN BURNS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
BENJAMIN MIMMS (“Plaintiff”), currently detained
at San Diego Central Jail (“SDCJ”) and proceeding
pro se, has filed a two-page Complaint against California
State Attorney General Xavier Becerra seeking $29 million in
damages based on his alleged involvement in a treasonous plot
to kidnap Plaintiff for ransom in order to “steal [his]
fame.” See ECF No. 1 at 1-2.
has not prepaid the $400 filing fee required to commence
civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), instead
has he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
See ECF No. 2.
Motion to Proceed IFP
parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a
district court of the United States, except an application
for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may
proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the
entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.
Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if
the plaintiff is a prisoner at the time of filing, he may be
granted leave to proceed IFP, but he nevertheless remains
obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments, ”
see Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th
Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his action is ultimately
dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) &
(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th
Cir. 2002). A “prisoner” is defined as “any
person” who at the time of filing is
“incarcerated or detained in any facility who is
accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated
delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or
conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or
diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h);
Taylor, 281 F.3d at 847.
order to comply with the PLRA, prisoners seeking leave to
proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of
the[ir] trust fund account statement (or institutional
equivalent) ... for the 6-month period immediately preceding
the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the
Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average
monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or
(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past
six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no
assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (4);
see Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850. Thereafter, the
institution having custody of the prisoner collects
subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding
month's income, in any month in which the prisoner's
account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until the
entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. §
Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a), he has not attached a certified copy
of his SDCJ trust account statements for the 6-month period
immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR
3.2. Section 1915(a)(2) clearly requires that prisoners
“seeking to bring a civil action ... without prepayment
of fees ... shall submit a certified copy of the
trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent)
... for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing
of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2)
Plaintiff's trust account statements, Plaintiff's IFP
Motion is incomplete and must be DENIED because the Court is
unable to assess the appropriate amount of the initial filing
fee statutorily required to initiate the prosecution of this
action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Screening of Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
addition, while the Court would ordinarily grant Plaintiff
leave to correct his IFP Motion's deficiencies, it
instead finds it appropriate to screen his Complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because at the time of filing
Plaintiff was, and remains, “incarcerated or detained
in any facility [because he] is accused of, convicted of,
sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of
criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation,
pretrial release, or diversionary program.” Olivas
v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284
(9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), 1915A(c);
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)).
1915A “mandates early review-‘before docketing 
or  as soon as practicable after docketing'-for all
complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.'” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d
1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016). The mandatory screening
provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter
their fee status, who bring suit against a governmental
entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g. Resnick v.
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). “On
review, the court shall … dismiss the complaint, or
any portion of the complaint, ” if it “(1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.”
Olivas, 856 F.3d at 1283 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)). “The purpose of § 1915A is to
‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious
suits need not bear the expense of responding.'”
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir.
2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
pleading is “factual[ly] frivolous” if
“the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational
or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially
noticeable facts available to contradict them.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1992).
Section 1915 gives courts “the unusual power to pierce
the veil” of a Complaint like Plaintiff's and to
“dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). Clearly baseless factual allegations
include those “that are ‘fanciful, '
‘fantastic, ' and ‘delusional.'”
Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (quoting Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 325, 327, 328).
invokes no arguable legal basis for his suit. What is more,
his factual allegations are plainly frivolous. Id.; see
also O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir.
1990) (“An in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous if
it has no arguable basis in fact or law.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). For example, Plaintiff
claims he is a “political prisoner” and related
to President Donald Trump “by way of relational
business in real estate, ” and due to his technological
invention. See ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff further
contends California's Attorney General “and his
people” have “taken a fake statute to
court” in order to “beat and kill ugly Plaintiff
at [his] own expense” as part of a treasonous plot to
“ransom Plaintiff's legal capital against President
Donald Trump.” Id. at 2.
conclusory, disjointed, and incoherent, these allegations
also appear grounded in delusion, are facially irrational,
and wholly incredible. Therefore, Plaintiff's Complaint
demands sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1). See Denton, 504 U.S. at 25-26;
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324; see also Suess v.
Obama, 2017 WL 1371289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017)
(dismissing as frivolous complaint alleging conspiracy among
President, CIA, and FBI to torment plaintiff over six year
period); Frost v. Vasan, No. 16-CV-05883 NC, 2017 WL
2081094, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017) (dismissing as
frivolous claims against a United States Senator, a
university, two corporate entities, and additional
unspecified defendants for having allegedly conspired with a
secret elite group of businessmen and the CIA to torment
him); Sierra v. Moon, 2012 WL 423483, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2012) (dismissing as frivolous an alleged
conspiracy by defendants with ex-military and CIA to defraud
plaintiffs' interests and murder him); Demos v.
United States, 2010 WL 4007527, at *2 (D. Ore. Oct. 8,
2010) (dismissing ...