California Court of Appeals, Second District, Eighth Division
MARIA G. GARCIA, Plaintiff and Appellant,
GILBERT ESCOBAR, Defendant and Respondent.
from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No.
LQ020533, Robert E. Willett, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Violence Appellate Project, Catherine Ongiri, Erin C. Smith,
Jennafer Dorfman Wagner, Anya Emerson; Mayer Brown, Donald M.
Falk and Samantha Booth for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hamilton, Pamela S. Palmer, Brian M. Nichilo and Courtney A.
Munnings for the California Women's Law Center as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
‘juvenile court' is a superior court exercising
limited jurisdiction arising under juvenile law.”
(In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 200.)
“ ‘[F]amily court' refers to the activities
of one or more superior court judicial officers who handle
litigation arising under the Family Code. It is not a
separate court with special jurisdiction, but is instead the
superior court performing one of its general duties.”
(Id. at p. 201.) Both the juvenile court and the
family court may issue protective orders to protect against
domestic violence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§
213.5, 304; Fam. Code, §§ 6218, 6320.) A protective
order enjoins specific acts of abuse. (Fam. Code, §
case, the juvenile court issued a protective order,
protecting appellant Maria G. Garcia and her daughter and
enjoining respondent Gilbert Escobar from specified acts of
abuse. The protective order remained effective after the
juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction. On appeal, Garcia
and amicus curiae persuasively show that Family Code section
6345-which governs the renewal of a domestic
violence restraining order-applies to the renewal of a
domestic violence restraining order issued by a juvenile
court (not exclusively to the renewal of an order issued by
the family court). We hold that after a juvenile court has
terminated its jurisdiction, the family court has
jurisdiction over domestic violence orders and may issue a
renewal. We remand the case to the superior court to apply
the renewal statute.
and Escobar dated for seven years and separated in July 2013.
Their only child, A., was three at the time of their
29, 2013, Garcia filed a request for a restraining order in
family court (Judicial Council form DV-100). The case
apparently was transferred to juvenile court. On September
16, 2013, the juvenile court issued a restraining order
protecting Garcia and A. from Escobar. The order indicated
that it was an “[o]rder [a]fter [h]earing, ” and
that a hearing had been conducted September 16, 2013. The
order expired September 16, 2016. The order was on a form
mandated by the Judicial Council, which referenced both the
Welfare and Institutions Code and the Family Code. The order
enjoined Escobar from “molest[ing], attack[ing],
strik[ing], stalk[ing], threaten[ing], sexually assault[ing],
batter[ing], harass[ing], destroy[ing] the personal property
of, contact[ing], or disturb[ing] the peace” and
required him to stay 100 yards from Garcia and A. except for
his visitation of A.
20, 2014-prior to the expiration of the restraining order-the
juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction. Escobar was
permitted only supervised visitation of A. because, among
other reasons, he had not made progress in his court ordered
domestic violence offenders program.
Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order
September 7, 2016 (nine days before her juvenile court
restraining order was set to expire), Garcia filed a request
for a domestic violence restraining order in family court. A
copy of the juvenile court's restraining order was
attached to Garcia's declaration. Also on September 7,