United States District Court, S.D. California
ANTOINE L. ARDDS, CDCR No. P-59915, Plaintiff,
D. HODGE; L. ROMERO; D. PARAMO; P. BARAMONTE; G. VALDOVINOS; RENTERIA; C. GARDINEZ; McGEE; SMITH, Defendants.
matters before the Court are various Motions for Injunctive
Relief (ECF Nos. 30, 33, 43, 47, 50, 52, 58, 63, 68, 70)
filed by Plaintiff Antoine L. Ardds.
L. Ardds (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, is
currently incarcerated at the Corcoran State Prison, located
in Corcoran, California. On November 16, 2016, Plaintiff
filed a document entitled “Coloring Agreement, ”
which the Court construed as a civil rights complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). In the three months after
filing his complaint, Plaintiff filed the following
documents: two certified copies of his inmate trust account
statement, which the Court construed as a Motion to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a) (ECF Nos. 2, 15); a Supplemental Complaint
(ECF No. 8); two documents titled Ex Parte Motions, which the
Court construed to be Supplemental Documents in Support of
Complaint (ECF Nos. 12, 14); a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (ECF No. 6); a Motion to Dismiss Improperly Named
Defendant (ECF No. 10); and an Ex Parte Notice (ECF No. 4).
February 28, 2017, this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, denied the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, granted the Motion to Dismiss an
improperly named defendant, and dismissed the Complaint for
failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
(ECF No. 18). On March 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 23). On May
4, 2017, this Court found Plaintiff's FAC
“contained factual content sufficient to survive the
‘low threshold' for proceeding past the sua sponte
screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b).” (ECF No. 24 at 9).
has filed ten motions for injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 30, 33,
43, 47, 50, 52, 58, 63, 68, 70) and eleven declarations in
support of the requested remedial measures (ECF Nos. 54, 60,
61, 64, 65, 76, 77, 80, 82, 88, 90) for alleged
“continued  acts of intimidation, harassment,
threats, physical assaults on disable [sic] E.O.P. patients,
” “hinderance [sic] of Plaintiff's access to
other district courts, ” “failing to send
Plaintiff's legal boxs [sic], legal mail, ” (ECF
No. 50 at 2, 7) and improper denial of single-cell status
(ECF No. 64 at 3). On August 8, 2017 the Court ordered
Defendants to reply to six Motions for Preliminary Injunction
(ECF Nos. 30, 33, 43, 47, 50, 52) that Plaintiff had filed at
the time. (ECF No. 53). On August 28, 2017, Defendants filed
a response in opposition to the six motions for injunctive
relief identified by the Court, and one motion (ECF No. 63)
filed by Plaintiff subsequent to the Court's order. (ECF
No. 66 at 1). On September 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion
requesting an extension for his reply to Defendants'
opposition (ECF No. 73), which the Court granted on September
19, 2017. (ECF No. 74). Plaintiff has filed additional
declarations in support of his previously filed motions (ECF
Nos. 76, 77, 80, 82, 88, 90) and two additional motions for
injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 68, 70).
November 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed his reply to
Defendants' Response to his motions for injunctive
relief. (ECF No. 92).
contends that (1) he has “been continuously harassed
and denied access to legal property” (ECF No. 30 at 1);
(2) his “legal boxes at RJD, have been destroyed per
order by Defendant D. Paramo” (ECF No. 33 at 1); and
(3) his four transfers since February 2017 are a result of
Defendants' efforts to “hinder plaintiff's
access to the courts by hiding him in other
facilit[ies].” (ECF No. 50 at 13). Plaintiff further
contends that the refusal by Defendants to place him on
single cell status has put him at “substantial risk of
harm from other inmates.” (ECF No. 43 at 4). Plaintiff
also makes claims about alleged assaults on inmates not party
to this case and requests that the Court order an
investigation of the alleged assaults. (ECF Nos. 50, 63).
Plaintiff requests that the Court order Defendants to
“release [his] legal property so that [he] may respond
to Court deadlines, ” (ECF No. 33 at 2) “place
him on single cell status, ” (ECF No. 43 at 4) and
“rehouse [him] on a safer and constitutional [sic]
secured facility.” (ECF No. 50 at 3). Plaintiff
requests that the Court “order CDCR's direct [sic]
secretary, Scott Kernan to conduct an adequate investigation
into the assault and battery upon inmates Dion Terrell . . .
and K. Flemmings.” Id. at 10.
contend that Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements for
injunctive intervention by the Court. (ECF No. 66 at 2).
Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not
established “a likelihood of success on the merits of
his underlying claim, ” a “ risk of irreparable
injury if his motions are not granted, ” or “the
balance of hardships that would result if his motions are
denied tip in his favor.” Id. at 2. Defendants
contend that Plaintiff's various requests for injunctive
relief are “overly broad, vague, and based on
speculation.” Id. at 4. Defendants support
this contention by offering the docket reports for cases
currently being litigated by Plaintiff in other courts.
Defendants assert the docket reports establish that Plaintiff
has not been denied access to legal materials or access to
the courts. Id. at 5. Defendants contend that
Plaintiff has not provided any “evidence that he meets
the criteria for single-cell status.” Id. at
6. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has provided only
“vague assertions” that he is unsafe at Richard
J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) and that
without any concrete evidence or allegation of specific
facts, “it is difficult for Defendants to submit
evidence to counter Plaintiff's vague assertions.”
Id. at 6. Lastly, Defendants contend that “the
Court cannot issue orders to defense counsel or outside
agencies to conduct investigations with regard to inmates
that are not party to this case.” Id. at 10.
65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the
Court to issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b). When the nonmovant has
received notice, as here, the standard for issuing a
temporary restraining order is the same as that for issuing a
preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co.
v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th
obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a movant must show
“that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Alliance
for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135
(9th Cir. 2011). At a minimum, “the moving party must
demonstrate a significant threat of irreparable
injury.” Arcamuzi v. Cont'l Air Lines,
Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted). “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only
on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our
characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter,
555 U.S. at 22.
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