United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT LIBERTY CREDIT ACCEPTANCE,
INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE; OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, TRANSFER (DOC. NO. 3)
Anthony J. Battaglia United States District Judge.
the Court is Defendant Liberty Credit Acceptance, Inc.'s
(Liberty) motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, transfer.
(Doc. No. 3.) Because the Court finds jurisdiction in this
venue is appropriate, the Court DENIES
challenge whether plaintiffs Romeo and Erlinda Lumbo have
sufficiently demonstrated that a “substantial
part” of their Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“Rosenthal Act”) claim arose in this
judicial district for the purpose of establishing venue.
Plaintiffs reside in San Diego, California, (Doc. No. 6 at
4), and Liberty's principal place of business is in
Wilmington, County of Los Angeles, California, (Doc. No. 3-1
at 2). Plaintiffs financed a vehicle in Los Angeles County
from Pacific Motors dealership, whom is not a party to this
action. (Docs. No. 3-1 at 2, 6 at 4.) Pacific Motors then
assigned the loan to Liberty. (Id.) Liberty began
collecting on the vehicle loan through letters and a
telephone call (Docs. No. 6 at 4, 1 ¶ 42.) Additionally,
Defendants Liberty and TDARC physically repossessed the
vehicle from Plaintiffs' San Diego residence. (Docs. No.
6 at 4, 1 ¶ 37.)
commenced this action in the Southern District of California
(SDCA) alleging Liberty violated the Rosenthal Act by
engaging in unfair practices of debt collection. (Doc. No.
1.) Separate and apart from this action, Plaintiffs filed a
complaint in the Los Angeles Superior Court against Pacific
Motors, alleging overcharges of licensing fees in violation
of California Vehicle Code § 11616. (Doc. No. 6 at 4.)
28 of the United States Code § 1391 is the general
statute governing actions brought in district court to
determine the propriety of venue. Section 1391(b) establishes
that venue is proper in the following instances:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if
all defendants are residents of the State in which the
district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or
(3) any judicial district in which any action may otherwise
be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district
in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(3). Thus, venue is generally
proper either where the defendants reside or where a
substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim
occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2). Section 1391(b) is
disjunctive, accordingly, the analysis of venue under the
first subsection is of no consequence to the other
subsections. See Sapan v. Dynamic Network
Factory, Inc., No. 13-CV-1966-MMA(WVG), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 192266, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2013).
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), the
“pleadings need not be accepted as true, and facts
outside the pleadings may be considered.” Doe 1 v.
AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009);
Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324
(9th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
the propriety of venue in the chosen judicial district.
See Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co.,
598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979).
Venue in the Southern ...