United States District Court, E.D. California
(14) DAY DEADLINE.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS
NON-COGNIZABLE CLAIMS, (ECF, 9).
MICHAEL J. SENG UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
is a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and pro se
this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (ECF No. 1.) He has consented to Magistrate Judge
jurisdiction. (ECF No. 3.) Defendants declined to consent to
Magistrate judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 37.)
November 22, 2016, the Court screened Plaintiff's first
amended complaint (ECF No. 9) and found it states an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim against CO Gonzalez and CO
Harris in their individual capacities, and a First Amendment
retaliation claim against Lt. Lopez in his individual
capacity. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff's official capacity
claims were dismissed with prejudice.
Williams v. King
courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their
jurisdictional power and are “obliged to inquire sua
sponte whenever a doubt arises as to [its]
existence[.]” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977) (citations
omitted). On November 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) requires the
consent of all named plaintiffs and defendants, even those
not served with process, before jurisdiction may vest in a
Magistrate Judge to dispose of a civil claim. Williams v.
King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the
Court held that a Magistrate Judge does not have jurisdiction
to dismiss a claim with prejudice during screening even if
the plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction.
Defendant was not yet served at the time that the Court
screened the first amended complaint and therefore had not
appeared or consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction.
Because Defendant had not consented, the undersigned's
dismissal of Plaintiff's official capacity claims is
invalid under Williams. Because the undersigned
nevertheless stands by the analysis in his previous screening
order, he will below recommend to the District Judge that the
non-cognizable claim be dismissed and that preliminary
injunctive relief be denied.
Findings and Recommendations on First Amended
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or
any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . .
. the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1983 provides a cause of action against any person who
deprives an individual of federally guaranteed rights
“under color” of state law. 42 U.S.C. §
1983. A complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice, ”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)), and courts “are not required to indulge
unwarranted inferences, ” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual
allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of his rights.
Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.
2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations
sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but
nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short
of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.