United States District Court, S.D. California
GAVIN B. DAVIS, Plaintiff,
SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY; MR. LEONARD TRINH; SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT; JOHN DOES, Defendants.
ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS; (2) DENYING AS
MOOT MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER; (3) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION
FOR JOINDER; AND (4) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION FOR ACCESS TO
COURTS (ECF NOS. 34, 44, 59, 63)
JANIS L. SAMMARTINO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court are Defendants Bonnie Dumanis, Leonard
Trinh, and David T. Grapilon's Motion to Dismiss Second
(Labelled “First”) Amended Complaint,
(“MTD, ” ECF No. 44). Also before the Court are
Plaintiff Gavin B. Davis's Response in Opposition,
(“Opp'n, ” ECF No. 48), and Defendants'
Reply in Support of, (“Reply, ” ECF No. 50),
their Motion to Dismiss. The Court vacated the hearing on the
motion and took it under submission without oral argument
pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 51.)
before the Court are various ex parte motions filed by
Plaintiff including a Motion for Protective Order, (ECF No.
34), a Motion for Joinder, (ECF No. 59), and a Motion for
Access to the Courts, (ECF No. 63). The Court will address
Plaintiff's Motions at the conclusion of the Motion to
Dismiss. After considering the parties' arguments and the
law, the Court GRANTS Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss, (ECF No. 44).
complaints must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555
(2007)). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing
court to draw on its experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity, and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]hen determining
whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as
true all allegations of material fact and must construe those
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions
are not.” Hoagland v. Astrue, No.
1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28,
2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts cannot
accept legal conclusions set forth in a complaint if the
plaintiff has not supported her contentions with facts.
Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Additionally, while the court “ha[s] an obligation
where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights
cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the
petitioner the benefit of any doubt, ” Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1
(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements
of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268
(9th Cir. 1982).
Motion to Dismiss
move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to meet
the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).
(See generally MTD.)
March 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed a meandering forty-four-page
Complaint that discusses various wrongs Plaintiff alleges he
has suffered. (See ECF No. 1.) Defendants San Diego
District Attorney and Leonard Trinh filed a motion to
dismiss, (ECF No. 5), as did Defendant City of San Diego
(erroneously sued as San Diego Police Department), (ECF No.
6). Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF
No. 9.) The Court denied the preliminary injunction, (ECF No.
19), which Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit, (ECF No.
22). In the interim, this Court granted Defendants'
motions to dismiss and dismissed without prejudice
Plaintiff's Complaint because Plaintiff failed to meet
the requirements of Rule 8. Instead of a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Plaintiff
filed a complaint that described events that were
“disjointed and difficult to comprehend.”
(“Prior Order, ” ECF No. 31, at 3.) The Court
found that Plaintiff failed to give Defendants fair notice of
the claims against them. (Id.)
filed a First Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 32), and then filed
a Second Amended Complaint, (Second Am. Compl.,
(“SAC”), ECF No. 37), but labeled the latter as
his “First Amended Complaint.” The Court will
refer to his current operative complaint as Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint no
longer alleges the City of San Diego as a defendant,
(id. ¶ 7), and instead names several San Diego
district attorneys (collectively “Defendants”).
Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff
also filed various motions, which the Court discusses below.
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court's
Order denying preliminary injunctive relief. (ECF No. 64.)
This brings the Court to the merits of Plaintiff's
Seconded Amended Complaint.