United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF
CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS (ECF NOS. 31, 38) FOURTEEN (14)
BARBARA A. MCAULIFFE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Gregory Ell Shehee (“Plaintiff”) is a county jail
inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
December 4, 2017, the Court screened Plaintiff's first
amended complaint and found that Plaintiff stated a
cognizable claim for excessive force in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant
Faith Perez for the purported two incidents which occurred in
November 2014 and the one incident on February 8, 2015, and a
cognizable claim for failure to protect in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against
Defendant Lain, but failed to state any other cognizable
claims against any other defendants. The Court ordered
Plaintiff to either file a second amended complaint or notify
the Court of his willingness to proceed only on the
cognizable claims. (ECF No. 31.) Following several extensions
of time, on February 23, 2018, Plaintiff requested that the
Court proceed on the claims against Defendants Perez and
Lain. (ECF No. 38.)
Screening Requirement and Standard
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against
an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion
thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or
malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a
plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts
“are not required to indulge unwarranted
inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer
possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not
sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short
of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572
F.3d at 969.
Allegations in Complaint
is currently housed at Fresno County Jail. The incidents at
issue in this litigation occurred while Plaintiff was housed
in Coalinga State Hospital, when he was civilly committed.
Plaintiff names the following defendants: Faith Perez,
Psychiatric Technician; Jack Carter, Chief of Police,
Coalinga, Pamela Ahlin, Director of Department of State
Hospitals; Audrey King, Executive Director of State
Hospitals. In this amended complaint, Plaintiff also adds
numerous other defendants: Jirri Lain,  Psych Technician,
S. Perryman, B. Price, June (unknown last name), K. Earl, J.
Lain, Murphy (unknown last name), K. Reed, R. Gonzalez,
Newmente, D. Landrum, R. Smith, Amber, Romero, Carlos,
Veronica, J. Taylor, and possibly other
defendants. All defendants are sued in their
individual and official capacities. Plaintiff's
allegations are as follows:
the Court can decipher from the mostly illegible writing,
Plaintiff alleges a sexual environment at the State Hospitals
where there were patient-staff sex rings. Plaintiff alleges
these sex rings existed from 2010 to about December 2015. He
was concerned and all staff and many patients were involved
and was known and condoned or should have been known and was
condoned by executives, administrators and staff.
alleges that he was sexually abused by Defendant Perez. As
best the Court can determine from reviewing the writing,
Plaintiff had a conversation with Defendant Perez in 2014 and
she said she likes chocolate. They went down the hall and no
other staff or nurses looked up from their computers.
Defendant Perez walked into Plaintiff's room and pulled
the door closed. She performed a sex act on him and they had
sex and she left the room. In what appears to be a separate
incident, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Perez performed a
sex act on him in November 10 or 11, 2014 and they had
intercourse. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Perez sexually
assaulted him again on February 8, 2015. Plaintiff alleges
she was custody staff and he was in fear of her. As best the
Court can determine, Plaintiff complains of three incidences
of sexual abuse by Defendant Perez and that he engaged in
these sex acts because he was afraid, and she threatened to
write bad and false things in his Health Medical Records,
which could affect his review of his civil commitment.
November 13, 2014, Plaintiff “enlightened”
Defendant Jirri Lain “of the sexual abuse . . . from
defendant Faith Perez.” Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Perez saw Plaintiff with Defendant Lain, and
Defendant Perez cursed at him and threatened to have more sex
with Plaintiff. As best the Court can determine, Plaintiff
alleges Defendant Perez continued to threaten him. Defendant
Perez tried to get close to another patient from 11/13/14
throughout December 2014, causing Plaintiff mental and
emotional distress. On 2/8/15, Defendant Perez forced him to
have sex with her on Unit 1, which Plaintiff did out of fear
of retaliation because she said that she, as a mandated
medical reporter, would write bad or false things in his
mental health records. Plaintiff alleges that he was forced
to have sex with Defendant Perez 3 times, against his will
out of fear of retaliation and which caused him emotional
pain and suffering.
alleges from 2013 to February 8, 2015, the administrators
denied plaintiff a basic review of Patient's rights and
bedroom decoration and walks throughout the hospital.
Plaintiff could not communicate with administrators.
alleges that Defendant J. Carter, as the Chief of the State
Hospitals, is responsible for the training and supervision of
the employees and responsible for their conduct and for their
unlawful sexual conduct with patients from October 2012
throughout 2013 and through February 8, 2015. Defendant J.
Carter failed to protect Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Ahlin, as the Executive Director from 2008-13, has
a duty to protect him and is responsible for the health and
safety of all patients, but failed to protect him. Defendant
received information from Plaintiff about sex rings, and
Defendant Audrey King from 2014-2015 knew of the sex rings.
(ECF No. 30, p. 26-27 of 112.) As best the Court can
decipher, Plaintiff alleges that all of the staff,
administrators and executives knew of the sex rings and did
nothing. The allegations are repetitive and confusing and
difficult to read with the pencil used by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also attaches some 90 pages of mostly illegible
Rule of Civil Procedure 8
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). As noted above, detailed factual
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff
must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.' ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual
allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.
Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
complaint is neither short nor plain. Plaintiff's
complaint totals twenty-five pages of nearly illegible
statements and over 90 pages of exhibits. In fact, the
amended complaint is less clear than the original complaint.
Plaintiff's amended complaint does not clearly set forth
the factual allegations underlying his claims; purported
facts are interspersed with conclusory recitations of legal
elements, which are repeated throughout the complaint. A
short plain statement of the facts is just that, short and
plain. In addition, Plaintiff need not allege in graphic
detail each of the 3 sexual encounters with Defendant Perez.
It is sufficient to state the date and that he was forced to
engage in a sexual act without his consent. Plaintiff's
complaint must be full and complete in and of itself, and the
Court will not refer to other pleadings or exhibits to piece
together potential claims.
Federal Rule of ...