United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE
HONORABLE KENLY KIYA KATO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Anthony Shawn Woods (“Plaintiff”), proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a
first amended civil rights complaint (“FAC”)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”) against various defendants alleging a
“longstanding policy, practice and custom” of
violating the constitutional rights of homeless persons in
Los Angeles. See ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”)
7 at 4. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
dismisses the FAC with leave to amend.
December 8, 2017, Plaintiff constructively
filed a civil rights complaint
(“Complaint”). Dkt. 1. The Complaint sued the
City of Los Angeles (“City”), Los Angeles Police
Department (“LAPD”), Los Angeles County Probation
Department (“Probation”) (collectively, the
“Entity Defendants”), and Los Angeles County
Probation Officer [FNU] Riley (“Riley”) in his
individual and official capacities (collectively,
“Defendants”). Id. at 3-4. The Complaint
alleged Defendants had a “longstanding policy,
practice, [and] custom” of violating “due
process” and “Federal Injunctions” with
respect to homeless individuals. Id.
January 11, 2018, Plaintiff constructively filed the FAC
against Defendants. Dkt. 7, FAC at 1, 3-4. The FAC alleges
Defendants have a “longstanding policy, practice and
custom” of “due process violations and misconduct
involving the homeless” in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 3-6.
to the FAC, in early April 2016, the LAPD handcuffed
Plaintiff and others who reside in Skid Row in Los Angeles
for sitting on the sidewalk and checked their statuses for
probation, parole, and outstanding warrants. Id. at
5. Plaintiff claims LAPD officer Clark and his partner then
issued tickets for “laying, sleeping or sitting on the
sidewalk” in violation of municipal code 41.18(d).
Id. The FAC alleges officer Clark said Plaintiff was
“on the Lt. Mathis shitlist” and because
Plaintiff was “still on probation, ” he should
“watch [his] ass.” Id.
May 2016, Plaintiff alleges Lt. Mathis and Sgt. Padilla
stopped Plaintiff, and Lt. Mathis asked Plaintiff if he
“liked [his] freedom” before handcuffing
Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff claims Lt. Mathis then said
he would “talk to his people at probation and have
[Plaintiff] violated, ” after which “probation
and parole w[ould] just rubber stamp [Lt. Mathis's]
request.” Id. at 5-6. The FAC alleges Lt.
Mathis said his “higher ups” gave an
“order” to clean up Skid Row, and Lt. Mathis
added he would “use every viable tool” so that
the homeless, probationers, and parolees would “get
tired of tickets and going to jail” and leave Skid Row.
2, 2016, Plaintiff alleges his probation officer, defendant
Riley, handed Plaintiff a notice of his pending discharge of
June 4, 2016. Id. at 6. Plaintiff further alleges
defendant Riley told Plaintiff, “You are no longer to
report to probation.” Id. Approximately four
months later on or about October 1, 2016, Plaintiff claims he
was “arrested for failure to report” even though
he did not receive “notice from probation telling or
informing [Plaintiff] that [his probation] was extended or
[he] was to start reporting again.” Id.
“As a result of this arrest, [Plaintiff] lost all [his]
property [when] LAPD and [the Los Angeles Sanitation Bureau]
LASB destroyed [his] property without a hearing or
seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff also seeks an order requiring the City and LAPD to
refrain from issuing tickets for violations of municipal code
41.18(d) to “the homeless or persons that appear
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court
must screen the FAC and is required to dismiss the case at
any time if it concludes the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th
determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for
screening purposes, the Court applies the same pleading
standard as it would when evaluating a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a), a complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim
“where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable
legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,
996 (9th Cir. 2007). In considering whether a complaint
states a claim, a court must accept as true all of the
material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v.
Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). However,
the court need not accept as true “allegations that are
merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or
unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec.
Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a
complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004
(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). A claim is
facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference ...