California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division
County Super. Ct. No. SCR675204 Honorable Patrick M.
Counsel for Defendant and Appellant: Jasmine C. Patel,
Kathryn Seligman, First District Appellate Project.
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent: Xavier Becerra,
Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Eric D. Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,
Joan Killeen, Deputy Attorney General.
and appellant Liam Rhinehart pled no contest to one felony
count of carrying a dirk or dagger and one misdemeanor count
of exhibiting a deadly weapon. The trial court suspended his
sentence and placed him on three years' probation.
Rhinehart appeals probation conditions which ordered him to
“[s]tay out of places where alcohol is the primary item
of sale, such as bars or liquor stores;” to “[b]e
of good conduct and obey all laws;” and to “not
be adjacent to any school campus during school hours unless
[he is] enrolled or with prior permission of school
Administration or probation.” In order to address any
possible vagueness, we modify the last condition to specify
that he must maintain a 50-foot distance from any school
campus. We otherwise affirm as modified.
August 2015, Rhinehart entered a frozen yogurt shop in Santa
Rosa and started to harass a group of children. When a shop
employee asked him to leave, Rhinehart refused. Watching his
exchange with an employee, a customer thought Rhinehart was
positioning himself to attack the employee. The customer
stepped between the two and joined in asking Rhinehart to
leave. Rhinehart made his way towards the exit but was
challenging the customer to fight. As he held the store door
open, he appeared to reach for his knife. Fearful for his
safety, the customer punched Rhinehart in the face, and the
men continued fighting outside. Rhinehart pulled out his
knife and swung, nearly striking the customer. At that point,
the customer fled and Rhinehart gave chase. The customer
eventually returned to the yogurt shop, where the employee
locked the doors and called police.
police detained Rhinehart at gunpoint when he refused to
follow the officer's instructions to get down on the
ground. Nearby, another officer found Rhinehart's
backpack which contained a “rusty saw-like
was charged with two felonies: assault with a deadly weapon
(Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(1) (count 1)) and carrying a
dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 21310 (count 2)). He was
also charged with three misdemeanors: exhibiting a deadly
weapon (Pen. Code § 417, subd. (a)(1) (count 3));
resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer (Pen.
Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1) (count 4)); and possession of
a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350
negotiated disposition, Rhinehart pled no contest to carrying
a dirk or dagger and exhibiting a deadly weapon. The other
charges were dismissed. The trial court suspended imposition
of sentence and placed Rhinehart on probation for three
years. Among his probation conditions, the court ordered
Rhinehart to “[s]tay out of places where alcohol is the
primary item of sale, such as bars or liquor stores”
and to “[b]e of good conduct and obey all
laws.” The court also ordered gang conditions
imposed. One of the gang conditions was that “You shall
not be adjacent to any school campus during school hours
unless you are enrolled or with prior permission of school
Administration or probation.” The court noted the gang
conditions were imposed “without prejudice to [defense
counsel] calendaring this matter for a hearing to determine
whether or not those should be modified or whether
they're appropriate.” There is no record that
Rhinehart sought modification of those conditions with the
trial court. He now appeals.
granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose
conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public
safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.”
(People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.)
“A probation condition... may be challenged as
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.” (In re
E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153 (E.O.))
The vagueness doctrine “bars the government from
enforcing a provision that ‘forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague' that people of
‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.' ”
(People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500.) “A
restriction is unconstitutionally vague if it is not ‘
“sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what
is required of him, and for the court to determine whether
the condition has been violated.” ' [Citation.] A
restriction failing this test does not give adequate
notice-‘fair warning'-of the conduct proscribed.
[Citations.] A restriction is unconstitutionally overbroad...
if it (1) ‘impinge[s] on constitutional rights, '
and (2) is not ‘tailored carefully and reasonably
related to the compelling state interest in reformation and
rehabilitation.' [Citations.] The essential question in
an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between
the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it
imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights-bearing
in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is
impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some
infringement.” (E.O., supra, 188
Cal.App.4th at p. 1153.)
challenges to a probation condition are reviewed de novo.
(In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
In an appropriate case, a probation condition that is not
sufficiently precise or narrowly drawn may be modified in
this court and affirmed as modified. (See, e.g., In re
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892 (Sheena
Condition Prohibiting Entrance In Stores Where ...