United States District Court, E.D. California
THE ARC OF CALIFORNIA; UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY ASSOCIATION OF SAN DIEGO, Plaintiffs,
TOBY DOUGLAS, in his official capacity as Director of the California Department of Health Care Services; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES; TERRI DELGADILLO, in her official capacity as Director of the California Department of Developmental Services; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND UNITED STATES DISTRlCT JUDGE.
ARC of California (“ARC”) and the Cerebral Palsy
Association of San Diego (“CPA”) (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) brought suit against the California
Department of Health Care Services (“DHCS”) and
the California Department of Developmental Services
(“DDS”). ARC is a statewide organization comprised
of individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities, their families, and their home and
community-based service providers. CPA is a non-profit
organization serving the needs of individuals with cerebral
palsy in San Diego and is affiliated with the National
Cerebral Palsy Association. Defendants DHCS and DDS are both
involved in administering the provision of support to
challenge several of the State of California's
implemented changes affecting how it pays for services
provided to developmentally disabled individuals under the
federally funded Medicaid program. Plaintiffs' original
causes of action included claims under Section 30(A) of the
Medicaid Act, but in 2015 the Supreme Court determined that
Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act does not confer a private
right of action. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr.,
Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1378 (2015). Therefore, by Order filed
August 29, 2016, (ECF No. 208), this Court dismissed
Plaintiffs' Section 30(A) claims as moot. Plaintiffs have
several claims remaining against the State, specifically
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation
Act, and Cal. Gov. Code § 11135. Presently before the
Court is the State's Motion for Summary Judgment as to
those remaining claims. ECF No. 229. For the following
reasons, the State's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED
California, the DHCS is the state agency responsible for
administering the federal Medicaid program, known as
Medi-Cal. The DDS, however, is responsible for coordinating
the provision of services for individuals with developmental
disabilities for those covered under the Medicaid Home &
Community-Based Services (“HCBS”) waiver, as well
as under California's Lanterman Act, Cal. Welf. &
Inst. Code §§ 4500, et seq., which provides for
similar services and supports at the state's own expense.
DDS is accordingly charged with monitoring the 21 regional
centers in California who contract out services for
compliance with both federal and state law and to ensure that
high quality services and supports are being provided.
Id. at §§ 4434(a)-(b), 4500.5(d), 4501.
DDS is further charged with promoting uniformity and
cost-effectiveness in the operation of regional centers.
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Dept. of Developmental
Servs., 38 Cal.3d 384, 389 (1985).
lawsuit challenges four bills, as enacted by the California
Legislature since 2009, which operate to reduce or freeze
rates to HCBS providers. The first two bills made percentage
reductions in provider rates. Using payment levels from 2003,
the Legislature initially enacted a three percent reduction
from those rates effective February 1, 2009, through June 30,
2010. That reduction, along with an additional 1.25 percent
cut, was ultimately extended through June 30, 2012. After
June 30, 2012, the reimbursement reduction was decreased to
only 1.25 percent, where it remained until June 30, 2013, at
which time it expired entirely and was not reenacted. Any
challenge to this percentage reduction claim is consequently
now moot. ARC of California v. Douglas, et al, 757
F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2014).
third bill, as codified at California Welfare &
Institutions Code § 4692, enumerates14 unpaid holidays
over the course of each year for which vendors are not
reimbursed for many services. That bill has been termed as
the “uniform holiday schedule.” Fourth and
finally, the so-called “half-day billing rule”
limits regional centers to payment for only a half day if a
patient was present less than 65 percent of a program day.
See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 4690.6. The
State maintains that those reductions apply to all disabled
individuals irrespective of whether they qualify for services
under the HCBS waiver or under California's Lanterman
case was initially stayed pending the outcome of the Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari in Douglas v. Independent
Living Center of Southern California, Inc., 132 S.Ct.
1204 (2012). Once that stay was lifted, Plaintiffs moved for
a preliminary injunction on various grounds, including
allegations that the State's billing reductions violated
the Medicaid Act. Defendants concurrently moved to dismiss
Plaintiffs' Medicaid Act claims on grounds that those
claims lacked merit. This Court denied both motions in
separate orders issued on July 1, 2013. ECF Nos. 119, 120.
Plaintiffs appealed the Court's preliminary injunction
ruling on July 29, 2013, and by its decision filed June 30,
2014, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. ARC of California, 757 F.3d 975.
Thereafter, on October 10, 2014, in light of the Ninth
Circuit's ruling, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial
summary judgment as to their Medicaid Act claim, which the
Court granted. ECF No. 172.
the Supreme Court's Armstrong decision finding
that Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act does not confer a
private right of action, Defendants filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (ECF No. 194) and a Request for Leave to File
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 199). The Court granted
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, vacating its
prior order (ECF No. 172) granting partial summary judgment
and permanent injunction in its entirety. ECF No. 208.
Plaintiffs' Medicaid Act claim, which constituted the
first claim in Plaintiffs' Complaint, was then dismissed
in its entirety.
claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans
with Disability Act, Cal. Gov. Code §§ 11135 and
11139, and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, remain pending. Having
granted Defendants' request to file an additional motion
for summary judgment. Defendants subsequently filed the
present Motion on July 6, 2017. ECF No. 229. Plaintiffs filed
an opposition to Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 230) and
Defendants filed a subsequent reply (ECF No. 231).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment
when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is
to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
also allows a court to grant summary judgment on part of a
claim or defense, known as partial summary judgment.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (“A party may move for
summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the
part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is
sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Madan, 889 F.Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The
standard that applies to a motion for partial summary
judgment is the same as that which applies to a motion for
summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); State
of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v.
Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying
summary judgment standard to motion for summary
summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis
for the motion and identifying the portions in the record
“which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility,
the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish
that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does
exist. Matsushita ...