United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;
[Doc. No. 3] DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE [Doc. No.
MICHAEL M. ANELLO United States District Judge
March 15, 2018, Plaintiff Jan Wojtaszek, proceeding pro
se, commenced the instant action against Defendant
Tramview Investors (“Defendant”). See
Complaint. Along with the Complaint, Plaintiff filed motions
to appoint counsel and to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). See Doc. Nos. 2, 3. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP and
DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint
For Leave to Proceed IFP
parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a
district court of the United States, except an application
for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed
despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee
only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169
F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). “To proceed in
forma pauperis is a privilege not a right.”
Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965).
need not be completely destitute to proceed in forma
pauperis. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). But “the same
even-handed care must be employed to assure that federal
funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense,
either frivolous claims or the remonstrances of a suitor who
is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull
his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586
F.Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). Based on the information
provided by Plaintiff, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a),
the Court concludes that Plaintiff lacks the financial
resources to pay the costs of commencing this action. As
such, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's IFP
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
Court is obligated to review a complaint filed IFP sua
sponte and must dismiss the action if it determines that
the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
.”). “[W]hen determining whether a complaint
states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations
of material fact and must construe those facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v.
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition,
the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se
plaintiff's pleadings. See Id. In giving liberal
interpretation to a pro se complaint, however, the
court may not “supply essential elements of claims that
were not initially pled.” See Ivey v. Board of
Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268
(9th Cir. 1982).
careful review, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Complaint is
frivolous and void of any plausible claims for relief.
See Cafasso, United States ex rel v. Gen. Dynamics C4
Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2011)
(collecting dismissal of cases which did not provide a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief). The Complaint is largely incoherent and
does not provide a statutory or legal basis for Plaintiffs
claims. For example, it appears that Plaintiff claims to have
been evicted from his home ten years ago for writing
“the truth about” Defendant's
“electrical energy usage.” See Complaint
at 2. Moreover, Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint legal
documents from his related 2012 case, a news article, DMV
records, a cartoon, and a photograph. See Complaint.
Although the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs apparent
unfortunate circumstances, the allegations set forth in the
Complaint do not state a valid claim upon which relief can be
granted. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to provide any basis
for the Court's subject matter jurisdiction over the
action. Because “it is absolutely clear that the
deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
amendment, ” the Court DISMISSES the
complaint with prejudice. Franklin v.
Murphy, 245 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984). The
Clerk of Court is instructed to close the case and enter
IS SO ORDERED.
 Plaintiff previously filed a similar
action against the same Defendant in January 2012.
See 12-CV-227-MMA-JMA (Doc. No. 1). This Court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice because
Plaintiff's allegations did not state a claim for relief,
or provide any basis for the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. (Doc. No. 16). Plaintiff appealed
(No. 12-55874), and the Ninth Circuit dismissed
Plaintiff's case on September 12, 2012. Id.
(Doc. No. 24). Despite the fact that the Court dismissed
Plaintiff's Complaint in 2012, Plaintiff continued to
file various documents in the case through October 2017, at
which point the Court issued a “Do Not File”
Order indicating that no further filings would be accepted in
the case. Id. (Doc. No. 35).
 As such, the Court DENIES AS
MOOT Plaintiffs motion to appoint counsel.