United States District Court, E.D. California
KAREEM J. HOWELL, Plaintiff,
J. MACOMBER, et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
KENDALL J. NEWMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff
claims defendants M. Brady, C. Igbokwe, and D. Tran violated
his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from an
inmate attack during an October 8, 2014
transport. Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment is before the court. Defendants filed an
opposition, and plaintiff filed a reply.
forth below, the undersigned finds that plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment should be denied.
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint
August of 2014, while housed at the California State Prison,
Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”), defendant Cannedy
approved two chronos for plaintiff: (1) plaintiff should have
no escorts with inmate Barrett, CDC #AF-7863,  based on
Barrett's August 11, 2014 assault on plaintiff; and (2)
no group escorts, based on the “high attempted assault
rate on” plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 10-11.) Plaintiff
alleges that on October 8, 2014, despite these chronos, as
well as plaintiff verbally informing the officers at the time
of the escort about these chronos, defendants Brady, Igbokwe,
and Tran ignored plaintiff, and defendants Brady and Igbokwe
escorted Barrett, while defendant Tran escorted plaintiff
with a group of other inmates, out of the treatment center
and back to the living unit together. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) At
the living unit, Barrett “managed to slip out of his
handcuffs and brutally attack” plaintiff, punching him
in the face three times, fracturing his left jaw and cutting
the inside of his lip. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages and injunctive relief.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
seeks an order granting summary judgment on his claims that
defendants failed to protect plaintiff in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff argues that defendants failed to
comply with the chronos issued to protect plaintiff from
harm, but also failed to heed plaintiff's verbal warning
at the time of the escort, and thus were deliberately
indifferent to a substantial risk to plaintiff's safety
during the escort. Defendants argue that material disputes of
fact preclude entry of summary judgment on plaintiff's
Legal Standards for Summary Judgment
will grant summary judgment “if . . . there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). The “threshold inquiry” is whether
“there are any genuine factual issues that properly can
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
moving party bears the initial burden of showing the district
court “that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party, which “must establish
that there is a genuine issue of material fact. . . .”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). In carrying their burdens, both
parties must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials
in the record . . .; or show [ ] that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute,
or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see
also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“[the nonmoving
party] must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).
Moreover, “the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact. . . . Only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.
this stage of the litigation, the judge does not weigh
conflicting evidence” or “make credibility
determinations with respect to statements made in affidavits.
. . .” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all
inferences and views all evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587-88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th
Cir. 2008). “Where the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial.'” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
(quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
Plaintiff is a California prison inmate who was confined at
CSP-SAC at all relevant times.
Defendants Brady, Igbokwe, and Tran were correctional
officers employed at CSP-SAC.
August 11, 2014, CSP-SAC Facility Captain Cannedy approved
and issued a 128-B chrono stating plaintiff shall have no
escorts with inmate Barrett, CDCR #AF-7863, based on
Barrett's August 11, 2014 assault on plaintiff. (ECF No.
50 at 16.)
August 11, 2014, CSP-SAC Facility Captain approved and issued
a 128-B chrono stating that plaintiff shall not be included
in a group escort, based on the “high attempted assault
rate” on plaintiff's life (there were three