United States District Court, E.D. California
MARK A. BOLEN, Plaintiff,
STEWART SHERMAN, et al., Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 1) ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL WITHOUT PREJUDICE
BARBARA A. McAULIFFE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Mark A. Bolen (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's
complaint, filed on October 2, 2017, is currently before the
Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.)
Screening Requirement and Standard
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against
an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion
thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or
malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .
. .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts
“are not required to indulge unwarranted
inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer
possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not
sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short
of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572
F.3d at 969.
is currently housed at the California Substance Abuse
Treatment Facility in Corcoran, California, where the events
in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff
names the following defendants: (1) Warden Stewart Sherman;
and (2) Dr. Winafred Kokor.
Claim 1, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights and alleges as follows:
Due to Dr Kokors removal of my DNM (ADA) status and lower
tier lower bunk chrono's and interferance in the 602/ADA
1824 Appeals Process I have continually been injured during
these last 3 years. Dr Kokor knows my medical history prior
to prison (military) and chooses not to treat me fully. By
ordering braces, medication, and x rays he acknowledges the
medical need and the problem but still refuses to give back
the ADA status and L/L chrono's.
(ECF No. 1 at 3) (unedited text). Plaintiff asserts that his
right knee was injured and he now has to wear a metal-hinged
knee brace on both legs. Recent x-rays of his mid to lower
back also showed 6 vertebrae are fractured and he has a
possible bone spur. (Id.)
Claim II, Plaintiff asserts a violation of the First
Amendment and alleges as follows:
While 602ing preparing the lawsuite (15W-0148A) Dr Kokor
began removing my ADA status and L/L chrono's. Once I
filed the writ he finished removing all chrono's from the
computers. Since then he refuses to give the L/L chrono's
back or ADA status and even interfeared in the 1824 ...