United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER REOPENING ACTION; ORDER OF DISMISSAL
RICHARD SEEBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
federal habeas corpus action was dismissed because petitioner
failed to file an application to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) or pay the filing fee by
the deadline; and because he failed to file a petition using
this Court's form. Petitioner since has filed an IFP
application and a petition on the correct form. The action is
REOPENED. The Clerk is directed to modify the docket
accordingly. The order of dismissal and the judgment are
VACATED. (Dkt. Nos. 4 and 5.)
seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 from
his pretrial detention. The petition for such relief is now
before the Court for review. For the reasons stated herein,
the petition is DISMISSED.
Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus from
a person claiming to be “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A district court considering an
application for a writ of habeas corpus shall “award
the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show
cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears
from the application that the applicant or person detained is
not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
2241 allows “the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,
the district courts and any circuit judge” to grant
writs of habeas corpus “within their respective
jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A habeas
petition under section 2241 is the appropriate vehicle for a
challenge to a person's detention when the person is in
custody, but not pursuant to the judgment of a state court,
e.g., it is the appropriate basis for a challenge to
detention by a pretrial detainee. See Hoyle v. Ada
County, 501 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007).
grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner alleges that he
(1) was unconstitutionally deprived of a hearing; (2) is
suffering under unconstitutional conditions of confinement;
and (3) is being denied his right to a jury trial. All these
claims are DISMISSED.
the first and third claims, the Court abstains from
interfering in the on-going state criminal proceedings. Under
principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should
not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by
granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent
extraordinary circumstances. See Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). More specifically, federal courts
should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions absent
a showing of the state's bad faith or harassment, or a
showing that the statute challenged is “flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions.” Id. at 46, 53-54.
Younger abstention is required when (1) state
proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending; (2) the state
proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the
state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the
constitutional issue. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm.
v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
is appropriate here because all of the elements of
Younger are present. Nothing in the petition
suggests there are extraordinary circumstances requiring this
Court's interference in state court criminal proceedings.
As to the first Younger element, the record
demonstrates that petitioner's state court proceedings
are ongoing. Petitioner had a probable cause hearing in
January 2018, during which his next hearing date was set for
February 22, 2018. (Pet., Dkt. No. 6 at 7, 10.)
the second Younger element, the Supreme Court has
held that “a proper respect for state functions,
” such as ongoing criminal trial proceedings, is an
important issue of state interest. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-492 (1973) (quoting
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). As to the third prong of
Younger, the Court finds no reason petitioner cannot
pursue his constitutional claims in state court. Furthermore,
any interference by this Court in the state court proceedings
would cause results disapproved of by Younger.
SJSVCCPAC v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092
(9th Cir. 2008) (citing cases).
Younger abstention is applicable here. When
Younger applies, and the party seeks injunctive
relief, as petitioner does here by asking the Court to order
his release, a request one can infer from his filing the
instant petition, federal courts should dismiss the action in
its entirety. See Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v.
U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976). Claims 1 and 3 are
second claim, petitioner challenges the conditions, not the
legality, of his confinement. Therefore, if petitioner
prevails on this claim it will not affect the length of his
incarceration. This means that his claim is not the proper
subject of a habeas action, but must be brought as a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Badea v.
Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (habeas corpus
action proper mechanism for challenging “legality or
duration” of confinement; civil rights action proper
method for challenging conditions of confinement);
Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891-892 & n.1