United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS DOE 2 AND THE
SECOND CLAIM; ORDER AUTHORIZING PLAINTIFF TO CONDUCT
DISCOVERY TO DETERMINE THE IDENTIFTIES OF DOE 1 AND DOE
JENNIFER L. THURSTON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
plaintiff claims that when he was booked into the Tuolumne
County Jail, he reported to the classification officer that
he was a “dropout” from the
“Northern” gang. Despite this, he was housed in a
non-protective custody cell, which resulted in him being
attacked by the other inmates in the cell. Consequently, he
claims violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and
California's Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 1050.
The Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to state a
cognizable claim against Doe 2 and has failed to state a
claim under the CCR.
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous,
malicious, ” or that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .
. .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A
plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Iqbal, at 678. Facial
plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a
defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations
are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.
Iqbal, at 677-78.
1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder
v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498, 508
(1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim
under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the
alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the
color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243,
1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
section 1983 the Plaintiff must demonstrate that each
defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual
allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
Iqbal, at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Even
still, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of
meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, at 678;
Moss, at 969.
his original complaint, the plaintiff claims that upon his
booking into the Tuolumne County Jail, he told the
booking officer (Doe 1) that he was a “Northern
dropout.” (Doc. 10 at 3) He reports that during this
conversation, the supervising officer (Doc. 2) was present.
Id. A third officer, Doe 3, escorted the plaintiff
to C-Tank, which was a “whites only” cell.
Id. He alleges that this was a problem because he
was a dropout from a Hispanic gang. Id. He alleges
that he told Doe 3 that he was a Northern dropout and Doe 3
acknowledged that housing him in C-Tank “isn't
right” but did so nonetheless. Id. After being
placed in the cell, he was attacked by the other inmates.
Id. He concludes that the placement occurred despite
“the knowledge of Does 1, 2, 3 that [he] was a gang
dropout and suposed [sic] to be house [sic] protective
custody.” Id. at 3-4.
describes Doe 1 as the booking officer, Doe 2 as the
supervisor of the booking officer and the escort officer and
Doe 3 as the escort officer. (Doc. 10 at 3) As previously
stated, Courts generally look on “Doe pleading”
with disfavor. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160,
1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v.
Civiletti, 629 E.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)).
Nevertheless, the Court will permit the plaintiff to proceed
and will give him the opportunity to identify the
defendants' identities through limited
Failure to Protect
seeks to impose liability on the defendants for their failure
to protect him from the violent acts of the other inmates. As
noted above, in Footnote 1, it remains unclear whether the
plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of these
events. Though he concludes he was a pretrial
detainee, he offers no factual allegations, such as
indicating that he was arrested at a location other than a
jail or ...