United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL
OF COMPLAINT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE [ECF NO. 1]
Dominique Baker, a state prisoner, is appearing pro se and in
forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
complaint, filed on January 3, 2018, is currently before the
Court for screening.
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying
the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
names Dustin Hughson, Deputy District Attorney of Kings
County, and Suzan Hubbard, Associate Warden at Corcoran State
Prison, as defendants.
alleges that on September 8, 2011, Deputy District Attorney
Justin Hughson filed felony battery charges against him under
Penal Code § 4501.5 for an incident that occurred while
Plaintiff was a prisoner at Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff
contends that he only grabbed the wrist of the alleged
victim, who did not sustain injuries, and therefore there was
a lack of evidence. Nevertheless, he was convicted and
sentenced with a consecutive sentence of twenty-five years to
life. Plaintiff asserts that he should never have been
charged or prosecuted.
law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to
imprisonment: a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, and a complaint under … 42 U.S.C. §
1983.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750
(2004) (per curiam). “Challenges to the validity of any
confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the
province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on
circumstances of confinement may be presented in a §
1983 action.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Federal courts lack habeas jurisdiction over claims by state
prisoners that are not within “the core of habeas
corpus.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 934
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 645
(2017). A prisoner's claims are within the core of habeas
corpus if they challenge the fact or duration of his
conviction or sentence. Id. at 934. “[W]hen a
prisoner's claim would not ‘necessarily spell
speedier release, ' that claim does not lie at “the
core of habeas corpus, ' and may be brought, if at all,
under § 1983.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562
U.S. 521, 534 n.13 (2011) (citing Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)); Nettles, 830
F.3d at 934.
clear from Plaintiff's allegations that his claim
challenges and affects the validity of a conviction and the
duration of his sentence. As such, the proper avenue to seek
such relief is by way of habeas corpus petition filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Plaintiff is advised that
the proper venue for challenging the execution of his
sentence is the district court containing the sentencing
court, while the proper venue to challenge the execution of
his sentence is the district court containing the prison in
which Petitioner is incarcerated. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff wishes to bring a claim
which will necessarily undermine the duration of his
confinement, he must file a habeas corpus petition in the
district court containing the sentencing court. Therefore,
Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed.
the Court would generally grant Plaintiff leave to amend in
light of his pro se status, amendment is futile in this
instance because the deficiencies cannot be cured by
amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127
(9th Cir. 2000); Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a
proper basis for dismissal without leave to amend); see
also Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586
(9th Cir. 1995) (a civil rights complaint seeking habeas
relief should be dismissed without prejudice to filing as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus).