United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION RE: DKT. NO. 110
R. LLOYD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
March 27, 2018, the court denied plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, granted defendant's cross-motion for
summary judgment, and entered judgment accordingly. (Dkts.
April 3, 2017, plaintiff filed a declaration “in
support of Motion J.M.O.L., ” presumably meaning that
he now seeks judgment as a matter of law. (Dkt. 110).
Plaintiff subsequently filed additional documents. (Dkts.
112, 114, 115). Defendant objects to plaintiff's motion.
The matter is deemed suitable for determination without oral
argument. Having considered the moving and responding papers,
and for the reasons to be discussed, plaintiff's motion
for judgment as a matter of law generally are brought in the
context of a jury trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. No
jury trial was held here. Having read plaintiff's papers,
the court finds that they are more properly construed as a
request to amend or alter the judgment or for relief from the
judgment. Although such relief is available under
Fed.R.Civ.P. and 59(e) and 60(b), Picazo has not persuaded
that he is entitled to relief under either rule.
Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a
previous order, the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to
be used sparingly in the interests of finality and
conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v.
Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted). “Indeed, ‘a motion for reconsideration
should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances,
unless the district court is presented with newly discovered
evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an
intervening change in the controlling law.'”
Id. (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). “A
Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or
present evidence for the first time when they could
reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.”
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a
mechanism for parties to seek relief from a judgment when it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application, or when there is any reason
justifying relief from judgment.” Jeff D. v.
Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2004). A movant
may seek relief from a final judgment for six reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence that by due diligence could not
have been discovered before the court's decision; (3)
fraud by the adverse party; (4) voiding of the judgment; (5)
satisfaction of the judgment; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1)-(6).
Rule 60(b)(6) “catch-all” provision applies only
when the reason for granting relief is not covered by any of
the other reasons set out in Rule 60. Delay v.
Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007).
“‘Rule 60(b)(6) has been used sparingly as an
equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice' and
‘is to be utilized only where extraordinary
circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to
prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.'”
Id. (quoting United States v. Alpine Land &
Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Thus, a party who seeks such relief “‘must
demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control
that prevented him from proceeding with the prosecution or
defense of the action in a proper fashion.'”
Id. (quoting Community Dental Services v.
Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002)).
dissatisfaction with the court's order or a belief that
the court is wrong in its decision is not an adequate basis
for relief under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b). Doe I v.
Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 5:11-cv-02449-EJD, 2015 WL 5118004
at *2 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 31, 2005) (citing Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341
(9th Cir. 1981); Yocom v. Grounds, No. C10-03609
SBA, 2012 WL 2277909 at *1 (N.D. Cal., June 18, 2012).
has not met the standard for relief under either rule. He
reiterates that on June 23, 2016, he spoke with Judith Leal
and showed her a report concerning his injury; and, plaintiff
says that Leal told him that they were not going to use his
reports. Claiming that he took a drug screen first and then
saw the doctor at the Pinnacle clinic, plaintiff now denies
walking out before completing the second drug screen and says
that Pinnacle told him he was free to go to Randstad. He now
also complains that defendant delayed telling him about his
termination. In ruling on summary judgment, the court already
considered---and credited---plaintiff's assertions as to
his June 23, 2016 discussion with Leal. (Dkt. 106 at 12-13).
The court also noted the dates when underlying events
occurred and accounted for plaintiff's claim that
Randstad staff said they were not going to use his reports.
(Id. at 4, 6-7). Plaintiff has not provided a basis
to reconsider those rulings.
plaintiff's other statements and assertions, “[a]
motion for relief from judgment is not an appeal or an
otherwise proper vehicle to relitigate the underlying claims
at issue.” Kwong v. Santa Clara Cnty. Sheriff's
Office, No. 17-cv-02127-BLF, 2018 WL 2041797 at *3 (N.D.
Cal., May 2, 2018). “‘[T]he merits of a case are
not before the court on a Rule 60(b) motion.'”
Id. (quoting Casey v. Albertson's Inc.,
362 F.3d 1254, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 2004)). Picazo has not
presented any new facts or evidence that could not have been
reasonably raised earlier in the litigation. He argues that
defendant is lying, but he has not presented “clear and
convincing evidence that the [judgment] was obtained through
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct, ” or
that the conduct complained of prevented him from fully and
fairly presenting his case. Id. (quoting De
Saracho v. Custom Food Machinery, Inc., 206 F.3d 874,
880 (9th Cir. 2000)). Indeed, as noted in the court's
summary judgment order, plaintiff made myriad filings in
connection with the summary ...