United States District Court, E.D. California
GREGORY G. HOLLOWS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
acting in pro se and in forma pauperis sues defendant for
alleged civil rights violations. ECF No. 1. Defendant seeks
to dismiss the Complaint on several legal grounds. The basic
difficulty with this case is, however, the defective nature
of the complaint itself which requires dismissal of this
matter albeit with an opportunity to amend.
was stopped on November 15, 2014, by a California Highway
Patrol officer for reckless driving. ECF 1 at 41(Order
entered in 2:15-cr-00016-MCE-1). The vehicle plaintiff was
driving at the time of his arrest, at which time the officer
who stopped him determined he was a California Penal Code
section 290 registrant sex offender, was searched at the
scene. That search turned up optical disks notated in a
manner that suggested they contained child pornography.
Id. The vehicle was thereafter impounded and
searched again after which the suspected child pornography
disks were provided to the Child Pornography Task Force to
inspect them and determine if they indeed comprised child
pornography. On January 8, 2015, Petitioner was arrested for
possession of child pornography, id., and a federal
criminal complaint was filed in 2:15-MU-1 on the same date.
Id. at 17. Ultimately, based on the initial stop,
the district judge to whom the case was assigned suppressed
all the evidence used to initiate the criminal charge and the
prosecution was dismissed. Id. at 40.
alleges that defendant, a Sacramento Sheriff assigned as a
Special deputy United States Marshal serving on the Internet
Crimes Against Children Task Force since August 2001,
violated his federal constitutional rights in the several
actions he undertook while performing in that role in
relation to plaintiff's arrest insofar as:
(1) after a prolonged period of custody during which
plaintiff had asserted his Miranda rights, defendant
placed him under duress and “coerced” him into
signing away those rights, ECF 1 at 5-6;
(2) On December 12, 2014, defendant provided information
regarding his investigation of plaintiff's alleged
illegal actions to a reporter which resulted in a television
broadcast which acted to deprive plaintiff of a fair grand
(3) On January 9, 2015, defendant submitted an affidavit
containing misleading and false information to a United
States Magistrate Judge in order to secure a detention order;
(4) On March 17, 2015 defendant, who bore the duty to assure
plaintiff's presence at all hearings, prevented him from
appearing at a hearing scheduled to review his bail status.
actions are alleged to have violated several of
plaintiff's constitutionally guaranteed protections
individually and his right to due process of law
foregoing conclusions were to be proven with a factual basis,
a jury could find defendant liable to plaintiff. However, the
complaint fails to allege the necessary factual basis.
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires,
inter alia, that a Complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that plaintiff
is entitled to relief.” The United States Supreme Court
edified this rule in its decision in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-556 (2007), where it
addressed reliance on the Rule in determining the sufficiency
of a dismissal motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ” in order to
“give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests, ” Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80
(1957). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,
ibid.; Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and
Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to
relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to
dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d
ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (“[T]he
pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement
of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally
cognizable right of action”), on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact), see, e.g.,
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n.
1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v.