United States District Court, C.D. California
PRESENT: HONORABLE SUZANNE H. SEGAL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
ENTRY: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE SHOULD
NOT RECOMMEND THAT THIS ACTION BE DISMISSED AS
April 5, 2018,  Rudolph Hoskins, a California state
prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody
(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
apparently challenging the state parole board's 2015
decision denying parole for five years, as well as the
decision denying a petition to advance the date of
Petitioner's next parole suitability hearing. (Dkt. No.
1). The Petition appears to be untimely.
also imposes a specific time limit on the filing of federal
habeas petitions. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,
274 (2005). By creating a limitations period, Congress
intended “to reduce delays in the execution of state
and federal criminal sentences.” Woodford v.
Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1), as amended, state prisoners have only one
year in which to file their federal habeas petitions. The
one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1) begins to run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). For claims challenging
decisions of the state parole board, the one-year statute of
limitations begins to run when the time for administrative
appeal ends. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2004); Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077 (9th
parole board held a parole hearing on June 18, 2015 and
denied parole for five years. (See Petition at 47-83
(parole hearing transcript)). Parole hearing decisions are
reviewable by the full parole board, and they become final
within 120 days of the hearing. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,
§§ 2041, 2043. Here, the decision became final on
October 16, 2015. The limitations period began to run that
day, see Redd, 343 F.3d at 1085, and expired one
year later, on October 16, 2016. Therefore, absent tolling,
the instant Petition is untimely by nearly a year and a half.
provides a statutory tolling provision which suspends the
limitations period for the time during which a
“properly filed” application for post-conviction
or other collateral review is “pending” in state
court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); accord Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005). In addition to
statutory tolling, the limitations period may also be subject
to equitable tolling if Petitioner can demonstrate both: (1)
that he has diligently pursued his rights; and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. See Holland
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). “The
petitioner must show that the extraordinary circumstances
were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary
circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on
time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959
(9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Petitioner has not alleged any facts indicating that he may
be entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.
Petitioner's response to this Order should identify any
facts that would permit him to demonstrate that he is
entitled to tolling. See Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d
964, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) ...