United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A
DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS ACTION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF [ECF NO. 1]
Mark Daniel Blakesley is appearing pro se and in forma
pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
before the Court is Plaintiff's complaint, filed May 18,
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying
the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
2008, Sergeant Villanueva told Plaintiff that he had reviewed
his central file and found confidential information
concerning a trial held in 1990 in the Sacramento County
Superior Court. Villanueva told Plaintiff that his
co-defendant, Teddy Crawford, committed suicide after writing
a lengthy letter which exonerated Plaintiff of the crime of
murder. Villanueva told Plaintiff there was a trial in 1990,
concerning the suicide letter written by Crawford, but
Plaintiff was never notified of the trial. In 1991, Plaintiff
was processed for parole but was never released. Villanueva
told Plaintiff that the letter by Crawford combined with the
trial record should have resulted in Plaintiff's release
sought the assistance of a public defender. However,
Plaintiff was advised that unless he could obtain documents
from the confidential section of his central there was
nothing that could be done.
about September 29, 2016, a Board of Parole Commissioner
named Zarrannam released part of the documents which were
given to attorney, Michael Evan Beckman, who was assisting
Plaintiff at the time. However, Plaintiff has not been
provided with the documents.
requests access to the suicide letter of Teddy Crawford,
access to the trial record from the Sacramento County
Superior Court, the parole packet processed by Sergeant
Singer, and immediate release from prison.
law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to
imprisonment: a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, and a complaint under … 42 U.S.C. §
1983.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750
(2004) (per curiam). “Challenges to the validity of any
confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the
province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on
circumstances of confinement may be presented in a §
1983 action.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Federal courts lack habeas jurisdiction over claims by state
prisoners that are not within “the core of habeas
corpus.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 934
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 645
(2017). A prisoner's claims are within the core of habeas
corpus if they challenge the fact or duration of his
conviction or sentence. Id. at 934. “[W]hen a
prisoner's claim would not ‘necessarily spell
speedier release, ' that claim does not lie at “the
core of habeas corpus, ' and may be brought, if at all,
under § 1983.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562
U.S. 521, 534 n.13 (2011) (citing Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)); Nettles, 830
F.3d at 934.
clear that Plaintiff is challenging his conviction which
impacts the duration of his sentence. As such, the proper
avenue to seek such relief is by way of habeas corpus
petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Plaintiff
is advised that the proper venue for challenging the
execution of his sentence is the district court containing
the sentencing court, while the proper venue to challenge the
execution of his sentence is the district court containing
the prison in which Petitioner is incarcerated. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(d). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff wishes
to challenge the duration of his confinement he must file a
habeas corpus petition in the district court containing the
sentencing court. Indeed, Plaintiff has previously filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court in
Blakesley v. Yates, No. 2:08-cv-01595-JFM, wherein
he raised the exact challenge he presents in this case,
namely, that his co-defendant, Teddy Crawford, confessed to
the murder but he was not allowed to attend the court
proceedings regarding such confession. (No.
2:08-cv-01595-JFM, ECF No. 1.) The action was voluntarily
dismissed by Plaintiff on November 18, 2009. (Id.,
ECF No. 36.) Although the Court would generally grant
Plaintiff leave to amend in light of his pro se status,
amendment is futile in this instance because the deficiencies
cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); Schmier v. U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817,
824 (9th ...