United States District Court, S.D. California
(1) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING DEFENDANTS KATCHKA AND PARAMO
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)(B)(II) & 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(B)(1) AND (2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO
EFFECT SERVICE UPON DEFENDANTS CASTILLO AND ALVAREZ PURSUANT
TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(D) AND FED. R. CIV. P.
Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge.
William Bradley, currently incarcerated at the Substance
Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran, California, and
proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 21, 2017, in the Central
District of California. (See “Compl., ”
ECF No. 1.)
claims Correctional Officer Castillo and Sergeant Alvarez at
Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”),
in San Diego, California, violated his Eighth Amendment
rights by using excessive force to extract him from his cell
in the Ad-Seg Unit while he was incarcerated there on
December 21, 2016. Plaintiff further contends R.N. Katchka
failed to properly document his injuries, and Warden Paramo
failed to supervise his subordinates. (Id. at 2-4,
8-13.) He seeks $600, 000 in compensatory and $1.5 million in
punitive damages, and demands a trial by jury. (Id.
did not pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a) to commence a civil action when he filed his
Complaint in the Central District in November 2017, but on
January 5, 2018, U.S. Magistrate Judge Shashi H. Kewalramani
granted his request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF No. 6.)
on March 23, 2018, Judge Kewalramani transferred the case
here, finding that because Plaintiff's claims are alleged
to have arisen at RJD, and all Defendants are alleged to
reside in San Diego County, the Southern District of
California and not the Central District, is the appropriate
venue. (See ECF No. 9, citing 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b), § 1406(a).) Judge Kewalramani did not screen
Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) or § 1915A before the transfer.
Screening Required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and §
Standard of Review
Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint
requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the
Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint,
or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are
immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004
(9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
“The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that
the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the
expense of responding.'” Nordstrom v.
Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d
680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a
claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112
(9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680
F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening
pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar
standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule
12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct”
or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me
accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
claims that on December 21, 2016, while he was housed in
RJD's Ad-Seg Unit, he experienced “chronic &
severe abdominal pains, ” for his “I.B.S.,
” and requested Correctional Officer Castillo to accept
his “7632 Health Care Service Request Form.”
(See Compl. 8.) Plaintiff claims Castillo smiled,
replied, “We don't do ...