Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Sparks-Magdaluyo v. New Penn Financial, LLC

United States District Court, N.D. California

May 25, 2018

PHYLLIS SPARKS-MAGDALUYO, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
v.
NEW PENN FINANCIAL, LLC, Defendant.

          ORDER RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT RE: DKT. NO. 57

          MARIA-ELENA JAMES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         INTRODUCTION[1]

         When the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, it allowed Plaintiffs Phyllis Sparks-Magdaluyo and Melecio Magdaluyo an opportunity to file a proposed third amended complaint to “assert a RESPA claim based on the October 29 request to clarify the amount of debt owed” on Plaintiffs' home mortgage. Order re: Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl. (“SAC Order”) at 13, Dkt. No. 55. Plaintiffs timely filed a Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Dkt. No. 57; see id., Ex. 1 (Proposed TAC). Upon review of the proposed TAC, the Court struck allegations regarding Defendant New Penn Financial, LLC dba Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing's ability or authority to collect the debt and ordered Defendant to otherwise respond to the Motion. Order re: Mot. to File Proposed TAC, Dkt. No. 58; see SAC Order at 13 (ordering further briefing only upon finding proposed TAC facially states RESPA claim).

         Defendant filed an Opposition (Dkt. No. 59); Plaintiffs did not file a reply. The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties' positions, the relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS the Motion for the following reasons.

         LEGAL STANDARD

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within (1) 21 days after serving the pleading or (2) 21 days after the earlier of service of a responsive pleading or service of a Rule 12(b) motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Outside of this timeframe, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave, ” though the court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “Although the rule should be interpreted with 'extreme liberality, ' leave to amend is not to be granted automatically.” Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

         A court considers five factors in determining whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “Not all of the factors merit equal weight. As this circuit and others have held, it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight. Prejudice is the touchstone of the inquiry under Rule 15(a).” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining [] factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. at 1052 (emphasis in original). “Denials of motions for leave to amend have been reversed when lacking a contemporaneous specific finding by the district court of prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, or futility of amendment.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1987).

         DISCUSSION

         A. Futility of Amendment

         1. Applicable Law

         “A motion for leave to amend may be denied if it appears to be futile or legally insufficient. However, a proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim[.]” Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The standard to be applied is identical to that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Id.

         To satisfy the 12(b)(6) pleading standard, a plaintiff must plead his claim with sufficient specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

         2. Analysis

         RESPA allows a borrower or its agent to submit a qualified written request (“QWR”) to a servicer of a federally related mortgage loan “for information relating to the servicing of such loan.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A). To constitute a QWR, the request must “(1) reasonably identif[y] the borrower's name and account, (2) either state[] the borrower's 'reasons for the belief . . . that the account is in error' or 'provide[] sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower, ' and (3) seek[] 'information relating to the servicing ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.