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Taylor v. United Road Services, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. California

May 25, 2018

CEDRIC TAYLOR on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1-100, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND AND FOR AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES TO PLAINTIFF (ECF NO. 12)

          LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

         I. INTRODUCTION

         Before the Court is Plaintiff Cedric Taylor's motion to remand and for an order awarding attorneys' fees and costs. On March 7, 2018, Defendant United Road Services (“URS”) removed the case to this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), which provides that district courts have original jurisdiction over class actions comprising 100 or more class members in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and there is minimal diversity between plaintiffs and defendants. ECF No. 1. On April 6, 2018, Plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court. ECF No. 12 (“Motion”). Defendant opposed, ECF No. 13 (“Opp.”), and Plaintiff filed a reply, ECF No. 14 (“Reply”). This matter is suitable for disposition without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED.

         II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

         This is a wage-and-hour class action arising out of Plaintiff's purported employment with URS. On February 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Kern. That complaint defined the putative class to be “All persons who are employed or have been employed by Defendants in the State of California as hourly, Non-Exempt truck workers, industrial truck workers, industrial truck drivers, industrial vehicle drivers, industrial workers, and/or other similar job designations and titles during the period of the relevant statute of limitations.” ECF No. 1-1 at PDF page 14 ¶ 41. Defendant filed its answer on June 6, 2017. ECF No. 1-1 at PDF page 71. Pending at the time that Plaintiff filed his case was Brent Hooper, et al. v. URS Midwest, Inc. d/b/a United Road Services, Inc., Lead Case No. CIVDS1607489, Superior Court for the State of California, County of San Bernardino (“Hooper action”). On July 10, 2017, the court granted final approval of the class settlement in Hooper. ECF No. 1-1 at 83. The settlement class was defined to be “All individuals who were employed by [URS] in the position of California-domiciled Car Hauler employee in any pay period during the . . . period from May 13, 2012 through January 30, 2017.” Id.

         Plaintiff served discovery in mid-June, including requests for production of documents, interrogatories, and deposition notices. ECF No. 12-1, Declaration of Tony Roberts (“Roberts Decl.”) ¶ 3. Defendant resisted, arguing that Plaintiff and the putative class were not employees of Defendant and that their claims were covered by the class settlement in Hooper. It was at this time, in mid-July, that Plaintiff first learned of the Hooper action. Because Defendant did not consider him to be an employee, he did not receive notice or opt-out rights. Id. ¶ 8.

         Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant engaged in a number of communications that Plaintiff now claims served to put Defendant on notice of the class that Plaintiff sought to represent. First, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant on August 21, 2017, clarifying that the putative class was not part of the Hooper settlement: “In other words, Mr. Taylor and the class of similarly situated persons were not part of the Hooper settlement because Defendant did not classify them as ‘employees' and, therefore, [they] are entitled to pursue their claims under this lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 10. Second, Defendant sent a letter on September 27, 2017, to Plaintiff, stating in part that it was Defendant's “understanding that Plaintiff believes that ‘similarly situated' persons are individuals based in California who, while not a party to an IC Agreement, provided driver services to Fleet Owners.” ECF No. 12-3. Third, Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant on October 10, 2017, requesting that Defendant “please send me a ballpark estimate of the class size (for all California based drivers of Fleet Owners).” ECF No. 12-4 at 5. Fourth, Plaintiff cites his response to Special Interrogatory No. 1, dated November 1, 2017, which stated Plaintiff's position that “he and other ‘drivers of Fleet owners'” were non-exempt employees, contrary to Defendant's classification. ECF No. 12-5 at 4. Fifth is an email dated November 3, 2017, from Defendant to Plaintiff, in which Defendant stated that it was not in possession of any policies or procedures for “drivers of fleet owners that we have been discussing.” Id. at 2.

         On November 6, 2017, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff's claims were covered by the Hooper settlement. The court granted Defendant's motion on December 5, 2017, and permitted Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, which he did on February 5, 2018. He seeks to represent a class of drivers who were not directly employed by URS but drove for third-party entities that made pickups or deliveries for URS customers, defined as follows:

All persons who are employed or have been employed by Defendant in the State of California as all non-exempt drivers, car-haulers, fleet drivers, co-drivers or similar job designations who did not contract directly with but were dispatched by UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC. to perform pickup and delivery services for customers of UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC. or any related entity during the time period of February 1, 2013, to the present (hereinafter referred to as “Non-Exempt Employees”). This class of individuals does not include those drivers who received notice and opt-out rights in the class action settlement of Brent Hooper, et al. v. URS Midwest, Inc. d/b/a United Road Services, Inc (Hooper) Lead Case No. CIVDS1607489, consolidated with Case Nos. CIVDS1609866, 1612011, 1614514, filed in the Superior Court for the State of California for the County of San Bernardino; this class of car-haulers does not include drivers who have an ownership interest in an entity that signed, an “Independent Contractor Service Agreement” or similar written contract with UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC. or any related entity.

Amended Complaint ¶ 61. Defendant removed the case on March 7, 2018.

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “To remove a case from state court to federal court, a defendant must file in the federal forum a notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.'” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 551 (2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)). However, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

         CAFA vests federal courts with “jurisdiction over certain class actions, defined in § 1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.” Dart, 135 S.Ct. at 551 (quoting § 1332(d)(2), (5)(B)). “[U]nder CAFA[, ] the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains, as before, on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.” Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). “If the plaintiff's complaint, filed in state court, demands monetary relief of a stated sum, that sum, if asserted in good faith, is ‘deemed to be the amount in controversy.'” Dart, 135 S.Ct. at 551 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)). “When plaintiff's complaint does not state the amount in controversy, the defendant's notice of removal may do so.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §1446(c)(2)(A)); see also Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683.

         Under CAFA, there is no presumption against removal. Id. at 554. “Where facts are in dispute, the statute requires district courts to make factual findings before granting a motion to remand a matter to state court.” Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2013). On a plaintiff's motion to remand, it is a defendant's burden to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Dart, 135 S.Ct. at 553-54; Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Servs., LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2013).

         In proving the amount in controversy, “[t]he parties may submit evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The parties submit summary-judgment style evidence and using the preponderance standard “the court decides . . . whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Dart, 135 S.Ct. at 554; see also Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199-1200. Thus, “‘removal . . . is proper on the basis of [an] amount in controversy asserted' by the defendant ‘if the district court finds, ” using the preponderance standard, “that the amount in controversy exceeds' the jurisdictional threshold.” Id. at 553 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B)). When a party relies on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions, those assumptions must be reasonable. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199 (assumptions “cannot be pulled from thin air but need some reasonable ground underlying them”). A defendant cannot establish removal jurisdiction by mere speculation, or prove the requirement on the basis of unreasonable assumptions. Id. at 1197.

         IV. DISCUSSION

         A. Timeliness Of Defendant's Removal

         A defendant seeking to remove a civil action from state court “shall have 30 days after receipt by or service on that defendant of the initial pleading or summons . . . to file the notice of removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B). If the case is not removable on the basis of the initial pleading, “a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” Id. § 1446(b)(3).[1] “Section 1446(b)'s time limit is mandatory such that a timely objection to a late petition will defeat removal.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1142 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). “A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendant removed this case from state court on March 7, 2018, and Plaintiff timely moved to remand on April 6, 2018, within the 30-day window.

         1. Removability Of Original Complaint

         Plaintiff argues that Defendant was on notice that the case may have been removable at the time that it received the complaint on April 14, 2017. Mot. at 7. The 30-day period for removal “starts to run from defendant's receipt of the initial pleading only when that pleading affirmatively reveals on its face the facts necessary for federal court jurisdiction.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 690-91 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] defendant does not have a duty of inquiry if the initial pleading or other document is ‘indeterminate' with respect to removability. Thus, even if a defendant could have discovered grounds for removability through investigation, it does not lose the right to remove because it did not conduct such an investigation and then file a notice of removal within thirty days of receiving the indeterminate document.” Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. In other words, “we don't charge defendants with notice of removability until they've received a paper that gives them enough information to remove.” Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2006).

         Plaintiff argues that the class defined in the FAC is a subset of the putative class delineated in the initial complaint. The complaint, with its larger class than the one in the amended complaint, would have “led to the same or larger calculations than Defendant uses as a basis for the amount in controversy in its removal.” Reply at 7. Therefore, if Defendant is correct that the FAC could properly be removed to federal court, then the initial complaint - representing a more expansive class - must also have been removable, and Defendant missed its opportunity to do so by failing to remove within 30 days of receiving the complaint.

         Under CAFA, “defendants need not make extrapolations or engage in guesswork; yet the statute ‘requires a defendant to apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in ascertaining removability.'” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2001)). “Multiplying figures clearly stated in a complaint is an aspect of that duty.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has, however, rejected a rule that would require a defendant to rifle through its files to discover whether a complaint is removable when filed. It has instead adopted a bright-line rule limiting the determination of removability to the four corners of the complaint, because “objective analysis of the pleadings brings certainty and predictability to the process and avoids gamesmanship in pleading” and “avoids the spectre of inevitable collateral litigation over whether the pleadings contained a sufficient ‘clue, ' whether defendant had subjective knowledge, or whether defendant conducted sufficient inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 697. Stated simply, the Ninth Circuit has “declined to hold that materials outside the complaint start the thirty-day clock.” Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141. A defendant is under no obligation “to supply information which [plaintiff] had omitted.” Id. (holding that where nothing in the complaint indicated the value of other class members' claims, defendant had no duty to examine its own records to make a determination).

         While a defendant is under no duty to investigate facts beyond the four corners of the complaint to determine whether the case might be removable, if a defendant chooses to do so and in the process discovers that the case does meet the threshold requirements for removability, then it may remove the case to federal court. Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. The process is not one that it need conduct upon receipt of the complaint. See Durham, 445 F.3d at 1251 (“we don't charge defendants with notice of removability until they've received a paper that gives them enough information to remove”). Plaintiff is thus “incorrect in asserting that because [Defendant] could have ventured beyond the pleadings to demonstrate removability initially (as it did later upon receipt of the First Amended Complaint) it was therefore obligated to do so.” Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141 n.3 (emphases in original).

         2.Motions” Or “Other Papers” Triggering Removability

         Plaintiff argues that even if the initial complaint did not put Defendant on notice that the case was potentially removable, seven separate instances of correspondence, discovery, and briefing should have done so, each of which would have triggered the second 30-day window for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), rendering Defendant's removal untimely.

         The removal statute provides that if a case is not removable because the initial pleading does not disclose that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75, 000 threshold for diversity cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), “information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be treated as an ‘other paper' under subsection (b)(3).” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(A). Though this provision clarifies that scope of what qualifies as an “other paper” for ordinary diversity actions under § 1332(a), there is no obvious reason why it should not also apply to CAFA cases under § 1332(d), and the Ninth Circuit has treated the state-court record and discovery as “other papers” when determining the amount in controversy for CAFA purposes. See, e.g., Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that removal was timely when done within 30 days of plaintiff's responses to interrogatories stating that total amount in controversy exceeded $5 million threshold for removal); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining in CAFA action that “a demand letter sent during the course of the state court action can constitute ‘other paper' within the meaning of section 1446(b) if it reflects a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's claim” and that interrogatory responses and deposition testimony can likewise trigger the second 30-day window for removal).

         Plaintiff argues that on no fewer than seven separate instances, Defendant was put on notice of the same facts that it later relied on to remove to federal court following the filing of the amended complaint. First, Plaintiff points to an August 21, 2017, letter to Defendant that clarified that Plaintiff sought to represent a different class of employees from the Hooper class. Mot. at 11 (citing ECF No. 12-2 at 3 (explaining that Hooper covered only those that Defendant classified as “employees”)). This letter, Plaintiff claims, alerted Defendant to the identity of the members of the putative class, allowing it to make the arguments in favor of removal at that time. Second, Plaintiff relies on a letter that Defendant sent to Plaintiff a little over a month later, on September 27, 2017, which memorializes Defendant's understanding that the putative class covers those that Plaintiff believes that URS jointly employed, including parties to independent-contractor agreements or owner-operator agreements. Mot. at 12 (citing ECF No. 12-3). Plaintiff contends that this letter also put Defendant on notice about the scope of the putative class. Third is an email from Plaintiff's counsel to Defendant, dated October 10, 2017, that requested “a ballpark estimate of the class size.” Mot. at 12 (quoting ECF No. 12-4 at 6). Fourth is Plaintiff's response to Special Interrogatory No. 1, dated November 1, 2017, which stated Plaintiff's position that “he and other ‘drivers of Fleet owners'” were non-exempt employees, contrary to Defendant's classification. Mot. at 12 (quoting ECF No. 12-5 at 4). Fifth is an email dated November 3, 2017, from Defendant to Plaintiff, in which Defendant stated that it was not in possession of any policies or procedures for “drivers of fleet owners that we have been discussing.” Mot. at 13 (quoting ECF No. 12-4 at 2.) This, Plaintiff contends, again demonstrates awareness of the class at issue. Sixth is Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which demonstrated an awareness that the class that Plaintiff sought to represent included drivers of Fleet Owners and was sufficient information to permit Defendant “to calculate the amount in controversy as it ultimately did when it filed its Notice of Removal.” Mot. at 13. Seventh, and finally, is Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, filed November 20, 2017, which Plaintiff contends included sufficient facts about the scope of the putative class to allow Defendant to make the calculations that it ultimately did when it moved to remove. Plaintiff argues that each of these, covering a period from August 21, 2017, to November 20, 2017, signaled to Defendant that the putative class excluded the Hooper class and included Fleet owners, and thus began the 30-day window for removal. Despite this knowledge, “Defendant waited months to remove this matter based on the same facts it ascertained before Plaintiff filed his FAC.” Reply at 8.

         None of these triggered the 30-day removal window. Plaintiff cites a number of cases for the proposition that disclosures in “other papers” can serve to put a defendant on notice that the jurisdictional threshold for removal is met and begin the running of the 30-day window for removal. As Defendant correctly points out, however, in each of the cases Plaintiff cites, the “other paper” contained a specific indication that the jurisdictional threshold had been met.[2] Here, even putting aside Defendant's objections to whether the other papers that Plaintiff has identified truly were as illuminating about the nature of Plaintiff's claims as he argues, [3] Plaintiff does not argue that any of the seven examples contains a straightforward declaration about the amount in controversy. See, e.g., Mot. at 14 (“Defendant has been aware that the putative class in this case excluded Hooper class members and included drivers of Fleet Owners since at least August 21, 2017 and could have made the same calculations it made in its Notice of Removal at that time.”). None of them indicates the number of class members or the potential amount of money at issue; indeed, one of them asks Defendant to gather a “ballpark estimate of the class size.” A defendant is under no duty of inquiry where a document is indeterminate. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125 (“even if a defendant could have discovered grounds for removability through investigation, it does not lose the right to remove because it did not conduct such an investigation and then file a notice of removal within thirty days of receiving the indeterminate document”). Under the Ninth Circuit's bright-line rule, without a clearer indication of removability, Defendant was not on notice as to the fact of removability, and the 30-day period did not begin to run.

         The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Carvalho is instructive. The plaintiff there stated in the complaint that she sought $25, 000 in damages, though the complaint was silent as to the damages claimed for the other 500 class members. Only at her deposition, when she testified that the amount in controversy was at least $25, 000 per class member, could the defendant determine that at least $12.5 million was at issue in the aggregate, which was a paper triggering the 30-day removal window. None of the above instances that Plaintiff identifies comes close to identifying this level of specificity, either as to the number of putative class members or the potential damages at issue, and falls short of putting Defendant on notice that the case was removable. That Defendant was in possession of facts that did later permit it to conduct its own investigation and perform calculations that served as the basis for its notice of removal does not mean that it was required to do so or that it was required to do so at any particular time. Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141 n.3.

         B. Whether Defendant Waived Right To Removal

         Plaintiff next argues that Defendant waived the right to removal by moving for judgment on the pleadings, an affirmative act seeking a dispositive ruling that manifested an intent to submit to having the matter adjudicated in the state forum. A defendant “may waive the right to remove to federal court where, after it is apparent that the case is removable, the defendant takes actions in state court that manifest his or her intent to have the matter adjudicated there, and to abandon his or her right to a federal forum.” Kenny v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 881 F.3d 786, 790 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). Any such waiver “must be clear and unequivocal.” Id. Where a party takes “necessary defensive action to avoid a judgment being entered automatically against him, such an action does not manifest an intent to litigate in state court.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (Jan. 20, 1995). “In general, the right of removal is not lost by action in the state court short of proceeding to an adjudication on the merits.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Kenny, a defendant in a class action filed a demurrer and motion to strike on the deadline for responding to the complaint. After filing the demurrer, and before the plaintiff had filed an opposition to the motion, the defendant removed to federal court under CAFA. Because the complaint was indeterminate as to removability, and the defendant discovered grounds for removal only through its own investigation, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant had not waived its right to remove by participating in state court litigation prior to removing the case. 881 F.3d at 790-91.

         Plaintiff's argument fails for the same reason that the “other papers” did not trigger removability. Because it was not apparent from the pleadings or other papers that the case was removable, Defendant did not consent to jurisdiction by filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Courts “will not charge defendants with notice of removability until they have received a paper that gives them enough information to remove, ” and “[a]s long as the complaint or an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper does not reveal that the case is removable, a defendant, in effect, may remove at any time.” Kenny, 881 F.3d at 791 (quoting Kuxhausen, F.3d at 1141, and Rea, 742 F.3d at 1238) (internal alterations omitted). Here, without having received a complaint or other papers making it apparent that the case was removable, Defendant conducted its own investigation, determined that the case was removable, and removed to federal court. Without having previously been on notice that the case was removable, Defendant was not required to remove, and litigating in state court until it was on notice of the cases' removability did not waive Defendant's right to remove. See Id. at 791 (“In short, a CAFA case may be removed at any time, provided that neither of the two thirty-day periods under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) has been triggered.”) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). A defendant's litigating in state court prior to discovery that a case is removable does not manifest an intent to litigate there or “affirmatively ‘abandon its right to a federal forum.'” Id. at 791-92 (quoting Resolution Tr., 43 F.3d at 1240).

         C. Whether Defendant Met Its Burden Of Proof To Demonstrate Amount In Controversy

         Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over class actions under CAFA when there are at least 100 class members, there is minimal diversity, and there is more than $5 million in controversy, excluding interest and costs. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1195 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)). Plaintiff does not contest that there is minimal diversity between the parties but argues that Defendant has not met its burden to demonstrate jurisdiction on the other two requirements for federal jurisdiction under CAFA.[4]

         Where a complaint is silent on damages or where a defendant believes that the complaint understates damages, the removing defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197; Rea v. Michaels Stores Inc., 742 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014). Defendant has attempted to meet that burden here by introducing testimony from Eric Madison, Vice President of Human Resources for URS, in the form of two affidavits. The first, submitted with the Defendant's Notice of Removal, states the grounds for his calculations demonstrating an estimated amount in controversy of just over $5.1 million, exclusive of potential attorneys' fees. ECF No. 1-2 (“Madison Decl.”). The second, submitted with Defendant's opposition to Plaintiff's motion to remand, attempts to respond to some of the arguments Plaintiff raised in the motion to remand and further explain the basis for some of the calculations. ECF No. 13-1 (“Madison Suppl. Decl.”).[5]

         Plaintiff's suit claims violations for wage theft/time shaving, failure to pay overtime, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, knowing and intentional failure to comply with itemized employee wage statement provision, failure to pay all wages due at time of termination, failure to reimburse/illegal deductions, and violation of the Unfair Competition Law. Based on the Madison Declarations, Defendant estimates that there are between 160 and 182 putative class members. It does not have exact data for the hourly rate of pay for the class members or number of work weeks ...


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