United States District Court, E.D. California
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR LEHMAN XS TRUST MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-18N, Plaintiff,
v.
DARYL C. CHANG, SR., CHERI D. CHANG, Defendants.
REMAND ORDER
Troy
L. Nunley United States District Judge.
This
matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants Daryl C.
Chang, Sr. and Cheri D. Chang's (hereafter,
“Defendants”) Notice of Removal Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446, filed on May 9, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants
simultaneously filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth below,
the Court REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of
California, County of San Joaquin (ECF No. 1), and GRANTS
Defendant's motion to proceed without payment of costs
(ECF No. 2).
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
In May
2018, Plaintiff U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee
for Lehman XS Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2006-18N (hereafter, “Plaintiff”),
purchased the real property located at 3938 Zeally Lane,
Stockton, California, 95206 at a trustee's foreclosure
sale. (ECF No. 1 at 15.) Plaintiff served Defendants with a
three-day notice to quit the premises in early September
2018. (ECF No. 1 at 22-25.) Plaintiff thereafter filed a
Verified Complaint for Unlawful Detainer on September 14,
2018 in the Superior Court of California for the County of
San Joaquin (hereafter, “Complaint”), which was
assigned the case number STK-CV-LUDRF-2018-11549. (ECF No. 1
at 15-16.)
Defendants
filed the instant notice of removal on May 9, 2019. (ECF No.
1 at 1.) The accompanying Civil Cover Sheet explicitly
asserts that the Court's jurisdiction to hear the removed
unlawful detainer action rests on diversity jurisdiction.
(ECF No. 1 at 30.) Defendants' removal notice also
appears to raise the argument that the Court has federal
question jurisdiction over the removed action by operation of
the Seventh Amendment. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 2.)
A short-form application to proceed in forma
pauperis accompanied Defendant's notice of removal.
(ECF No. 2.)
II.
Standard of Law
Civil
actions originally brought in state court may be removed
“to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending, ” so long as “the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction” over the
action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Only state-court
actions that originally could have been filed in federal
court may be removed to federal court by the
defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
Of
course, one category of cases over which the federal district
courts have original jurisdiction is that set of cases
presenting a federal question “arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C § 1331. “The presence or absence of
federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the
‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that
federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded
complaint.” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392
(citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109,
112-13 (1936)); see also Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556
U.S. 49, 54 (2009) (restating “the established rule
that federal-court jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the
basis of a defense or counterclaim”). At the same time,
federal question jurisdiction can also exist where “a
state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue,
actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may
entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods.,
Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005).
Another
category of cases over which the federal district courts have
original jurisdiction is that set of cases where (i) the
matter in controversy exceeds $75, 000 exclusive of interest
and costs, and (ii) the controversy is between citizens of
different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Where it is
“not facially evident from the complaint that more than
$75, 000” is in controversy, a defendant seeking to
invoke a district court's diversity jurisdiction is
required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy meets that jurisdictional threshold.
Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117
(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Matheson v. Progressive
Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam)).
Finally,
“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
“Removal statutes are to be ‘strictly
construed' against removal jurisdiction.”
Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667 (9th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v.
Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002)). Indeed, district courts
strictly construe the removal statutes against removal
jurisdiction because “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be
rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in
the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980
F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (citing
Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062,
1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). “[T]he defendant always has the
burden of establishing that removal is proper.”
Id. (citing Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach &
Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990);
Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195
(9th Cir. 1988)).
III.
Analysis
A.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
i.
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Pursuant
to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court must look to
the face of the Complaint in order to determine whether it
presents a federal question that would establish the
Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Caterpillar
Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. The right to relief relied upon
in the Complaint arises under section 1161a of
California's Code of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 1 at 15.)
That section of state law provides that after certain
approved sales of real property have been duly perfected,
“a person who holds over and continues in possession of
. . . real property after a three-day written notice to quit
the property has been served upon the person . . . may be
removed therefrom.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § ...