United States District Court, E.D. California
TERRENCE L. DAVIS, Plaintiff,
J. GRASE, et al., Defendants.
ORDER SCREENING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF
NO. 1) THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE
Terrence L. Davis is a state prisoner proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
before the Court for screening is Plaintiff's complaint,
filed on December 10, 2018. (ECF No. 1.)
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are
entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to
have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v.
Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must
be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual
detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that
are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572
F.3d at 969.
Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint as
true only for the purpose of the sua sponte
screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
names Dr. Jerome Grase, Dr. Barney Rosen, Dr. W. Walsh, Dr.
Jennifer Seymour, Jessica Russell, Melyssa MacQuarrie, Julia
Mantonya, CCI Tascano, Janai Rodriguez, Johanna McCain, CCI
Rubalcava, Kelly Nesson, H. Leiva, unnamed members of the
IDTT on April 23, 2018, May 2, 2018, and August 1, 2018,
unnamed CCI Tehachapi Medical Appeals Office Supervisors and
Personnel, unnamed CCI Tehachapi Administrative personnel,
unnamed CCI medical personnel, Dr. Jane/John Does, and Jane -
John Does, Psychologists, Psychiatrists, Case Workers, ACSWs,
Supervisors, and LCSWs as Defendants.
arrived at California Correctional Institution
(“CCI”) on April 14, 2018. Upon arrival,
Plaintiff informed unnamed correctional officers that he was
having ongoing and severe mental health problems, including
paranoia, homicidal episodes, anxiety attacks, racing
thoughts, severe depressional bouts, and manic episodes. The
correctional officers contacted unnamed mental health
personnel, who interviewed and evaluated Plaintiff. After
Plaintiff was assessed, the mental health personnel concluded
that Plaintiff had to be sent to CCI's crisis beds and
then transferred to Kern Valley State Prison's
(“KVSP”) mental health crisis beds. On April 15,
2018, Plaintiff was transported from CCI's crisis beds to
KVSP's crisis beds, for acute care and/or treatment, and
was received and processed by unnamed KVSP mental health
personnel. Plaintiff informed the KVSP mental health
personnel about his immediate and acute psychiatric problems.
Plaintiff missed his first Interdisciplinary Treatment Team
(“IDTT”) hearing due to his mental health
problems, he attended the second IDTT hearing on April 23,
2018. At the hearing, Plaintiff described his immediate,
severe, precipitating, and decompensating mental health
problems. Further, Plaintiff told the IDTT hearing about his
history. Plaintiff explained that, while he was housed at
California Men's Colony, on August 31, 2017, he was given
a Rules Violation Report for threatening to kill his
then-psychiatrist. In September 2017, Plaintiff was sent to
the state hospital, PIP-Stockton, for a 180-day program due
to his ongoing psychological problems. However, Plaintiff was
released from the state hospital after 20 to 26 days because
he had developed plans to kill his PIP-Stockton treatment
he related his history to the KVSP crisis bed IDTT members,
Plaintiff asserted that he needed to be transferred to an
acute-care treatment program, like California Medical
Facility in Vacaville. However, the KVSP IDTT members refused
to send Plaintiff to California Medical Facility, stated that
they would make a referral to send Plaintiff to an
Intermediate Care Facility (“ICF”), and then
discharged Plaintiff back to CCI.
Plaintiff arrived back at CCI on an unknown date, he was
still as unstable mentally as when he left. Additionally, the
KVSP IDTT members failed to refer Plaintiff to an ICF.
Instead, the KVSP IDTT members made a suggestion that
Plaintiff be transferred to an ICF.
unknown date, Plaintiff was again sent to KVSP's crisis
beds for the same mental decompensation, but only stated for
an unstated number of days before being returned to CCI. When
Plaintiff went to an IDTT committee meeting at an unnamed
facility, the IDTT members stated that Plaintiff could be
placed in an ICF program, but also placed in an unnamed
alleges that Defendants are officials at CCI and KVSP, who
are operating within their assigned job duties and scope,
who, with a culpable state of mind, arbitrarily failed and/or
refused to provide Plaintiff with adequate, effective mental
health and/or medical care for Plaintiff's ongoing and
precipitating serious mental, physical, and emotional
injuries and deprivations. (ECF No. 1, at 7.) Defendants named
are employed by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation as mental health, warden, and medical
officials responsible for the oversight of the operations and
enforcement of mental health policies, protocols, practices,
standards, and procedures required by state and federal laws,
which create obligations to provide mental health care
services, meaningful follow-ups, treatments, and A.D.A.
accommodations, which are not being provided to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff asserts that his ongoing mental, physical, and
emotional deprivations continue to be disregarded and not
adequately treated due to Defendants' direct bias and
ulterior motives. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that all of the
Defendants are acting jointly together to delay, deny, and
deprive Plaintiff of adequate and meaningful mental health
care, treatment, and A.D.A. accommodations in order to try
and make Plaintiff hurt other people or himself.
Plaintiff asserts that he has no administrative remedies
because CCI personnel have arbitrarily and wrongfully blocked
his 602 HC health care appeals against the KVSP IDTT Crisis
Bed committee members and against the CCI IDTT officials.
Plaintiff asserts that, then, CCI officials wrote their own
602 HC health care appeal, without Plaintiff's knowledge
and consent, in order to negate the ongoing staff misconduct
and deliberate indifference.
relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, appointment
of a special master to investigate Plaintiff's claims and
provide all of Plaintiff's records to the Court, a
preliminary and/or permanent injunction, an order
transferring Plaintiff to an ICF 1-year program, appointment
of counsel, attorney's fees, and issue an order for
provision of appropriate mental health treatment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil
actions, with limited exceptions, ” none of which apply
to § 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). This is
because, while factual allegations are accepted as true,
legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57; Moss, 572 F.3d at
969. Therefore, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant's liability” fall short of satisfying the
plausibility standard. Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
“plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleading
facts, ” Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949,
977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se
prisoners are still construed liberally and are afforded the
benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, since “the liberal
pleading standard … applies only to a plaintiff's
factual allegations, ” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), “a liberal interpretation
of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements
of the claim that were not initially pled[, ]” Ivey
v. Board of ...