United States District Court, S.D. California
Ronnie L. MOODY, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 18)
HON.
ANDREW G. SCHOPLER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Four
state inmates claim they were attacked by prison guards. They
sued the guards, the warden, and the state prison agency for
excessive force and a host of ancillary claims. Defendants
now move to dismiss much of the complaint.
BACKGROUND[1]
On July
17, 2017, the four plaintiffs―Ronnie Moody, Gary Deans,
Billy Williams, and Donnel Jones―were incarcerated in
the same unit at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility.
(ECF No. 1, at 4-5 ¶¶23-24.) Things went awry when
a counselor kicked Moody's feet for blocking his way and
a fight ensued. In a clumsy attempt to subdue Moody, a tower
guard fired a “block gun” at him, but missed the
mark and struck the counselor's face, breaking his nose.
(Id. at 5 ¶¶34-36.) Finally, an alarm
sounded, summoning a flood of guards with better aim. The
officers shot Moody―successfully, this time―with
a block gun, pepper-sprayed his face, beat him with batons,
handcuffed him behind his back, and left him lying facedown
and motionless on the ground. (Id. at 5-6
¶¶37-42.) Then, for good measure, a prison
supervisor kicked Moody in the face, prompting dozens of
other guards to join in, beating the defenseless inmate into
unconsciousness. (Id. at 6 ¶¶43-47.)
Meanwhile,
Moody's fellow prisoners protested his beating, yelling,
“Stop!, ” “You're going to kill him!,
” and “He's in cuffs!” Plaintiff
Williams screamed at the guards, “I'm going to
report you all!” (ECF No. 1, at 6-7 ¶¶50-51,
59.) The officers stepped outside the unit for a brief,
private meeting. During this “huddle-up, ” they
planned “how they would threaten and attack the
prisoners” to deter them from reporting the incident.
(Id. at 7 ¶¶60-62.) The guards soon
returned to the unit to assault the other three plaintiffs.
Plaintiff Deans, “who walks with the aid of a cane,
” and plaintiff Williams were both punched in the face,
without cause. And plaintiff Jones was tackled from behind
and manhandled until his right arm broke. (Id. at
7-9 ¶¶65-85.)
In the
lawsuit that followed, plaintiffs allege that the guards
involved in the July 17, 2017 incident are members of the
“Green Wall, ” a “Mafia-like prison gang of
correctional officers” engaged in violence and other
crimes against inmates. (ECF No. 1, at 4 ¶¶19-22.)
DISCUSSION
To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). But “naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement” will not suffice.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal
punctuation omitted).
A.
Claims Against Defendant Paramo
Defendants
move to dismiss all claims against Warden Daniel Paramo in
his official capacity, arguing that Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity bars any money damages and that plaintiffs
fail to state a claim for any equitable relief. “The
Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal
court against . . . state officials acting in their official
capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub.
Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). But
“it does not bar claims seeking prospective injunctive
relief against state officials to remedy a state's
ongoing violation of federal law.” Ariz.
Students' Ass'n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824
F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2016).
1.
Money Damages
Plaintiffs
do not seek money damages from Warden Paramo (see
ECF No. 1, at 22 ¶3), so the motion to dismiss damages
claims against Paramo should be denied as moot.
2.
Injunctive Relief
“Under
Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for
actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious
liability.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d
967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013). Supervisors are liable only if: (1)
they are “personally involved in the constitutional
deprivation, ” or (2) they “implement a policy so
deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of
constitutional rights and is the moving force of a
constitutional violation.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). Such a “policy or custom may be found
either in an affirmative proclamation of policy or in the
failure of an official to take any remedial steps after the
violations.” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118,
1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).
Here
plaintiffs allege that Warden Paramo knowingly oversaw a
prison with unconstitutional policies or customs, in that he:
(1) “accepts or acquiesces in a pervasive culture of
violence against prisoners” at Donovan Correctional
Facility, including the existence of the “Green
Wall”; (2) “is and has been aware of the illegal
activities of the members of the Green Wall but has failed
and refused to take action against them”; and (3)
“reviewed or was aware of numerous inmate grievances,
learned of ongoing violations of inmates' rights by his
subordinates, and failed to take corrective action, thereby
allowing those violations to continue.” (ECF No. 1, at
3-4.)
The
Ninth Circuit has repeatedly authorized equitable relief for
supervisors who turn a blind eye to constitutional
violations, as Paramo allegedly did here. See, e.g.,
Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1127 (finding a policy or custom
that warranted supervisory liability based on “failure
to investigate the retaliation complaints, the lack of
reprimand or discipline for the officers involved even when
their supervisors were aware of the complaints, and the
delegation of investigation to officers involved in the
grievances”); Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d
630, 647 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding evidence of a policy or
custom of excessive force based on police chief's failure
“to take any remedial steps after the
violations”).
Thus,
plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded an unconstitutional
policy or custom. For reasons discussed below, however, the
injunctive-relief claims of three plaintiffs―Moody,
Deans, and Williams―are moot. See section F.
So, the motion to dismiss the equitable claims against Paramo
should be granted as to those three plaintiffs, but denied as
to plaintiff Jones, who may still bring an equitable claim.
B.
Claims Against Defendant Duran
Defendants
move to dismiss the complaint against defendant Duran
“because it does not contain any facts regarding what
Defendant Duran is alleged to have done during the
incident.” (ECF No. 23, at 3.) Officers “cannot
be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 unless they were integral participants in the
unlawful conduct.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d
1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018). “[D]efendants can be held
liable for ‘integral participation' even if the
actions of each defendant do not ‘rise to the level of
a constitutional violation, '” id., but it
is insufficient to merely allege “membership in a group
without a showing of individual participation in the unlawful
conduct.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935
(9th Cir. 2002).
The
Ninth Circuit has typically found “integral
participation” when the complaint plausibly alleges
that the defendant's participation in the constitutional
violation was knowing and meaningful. For example, in
Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2004),
a police officer threw a flash-bang device during an
apartment search, which injured the plaintiff. Every member
of the search team was deemed an “integral participant,
” because “every officer was aware of the
decision to use the flash-bang” and yet still chose to
“participate[ in the search] in some meaningful
way.” Id. at 780. Similarly, in
Keates, the Court considered which state employees
were “integral participants” in removing a child
from her mother's care. 883 F.3d at 1242. The Court held
that the complaint―“just
barely”―alleged integral participation by two
Child Protective Services workers who spoke to an employee at
the hospital where the child was being evaluated and
“collaborated in the issuance of the [temporary custody
notice]” that justified removing the child from her
mother's care. Id. Yet the Keates Court
held that the allegations against five other defendants were
insufficient, as the complaint lacked specific facts to show
that these “employees participated in the decision to
interfere with [plaintiffs'] constitutional
rights.” Id.; see also Sjurset v.
Button, 810 F.3d 609, 619 (9th Cir. 2015) (police
officers who removed children from home were not integral
participants, because they were not “privy to any
discussions, briefings or collective decisions” in the
protective-custody determination).
Plaintiffs
allege that Duran was a member of a group that violated
constitutional rights, but they fail to specify what he did
during the July 17, 2017 incident. The complaint alleges that
Duran was among 10-11 named defendants and 50 unnamed
defendants who: (1) were each “a member of the Green
Wall” (ECF No. 1, at 4 ¶21); (2) “personally
utilized, failed to intercede and prevent, and/or were
integral participants to excessive and unreasonable force
against Plaintiffs” (id. at 12 ¶102, 18
¶133); (3) “intentionally and personally touched
or gave substantial assistance or encouragement in touching
or threatened to touch Plaintiffs . . . without consent, . .
. [which] constituted unreasonable and excessive force”
(id. at 20 ¶143); and (4) “falsely
reported the incidents and injuries resulting from their
conduct” (id. at 10 ¶90).
These
conclusory allegations do not establish that Duran was an
integral participant in the July 17, 2017 incident, nor that
he was present for it―or even aware of it at the time.
The claim of after-the-fact false reporting does nothing to
change the analysis. “[P]reparing a false report about
an incident after it occurred cannot subject that individual
to liability for the force used during the incident.”
Sim v. Duran, No. 1:16-CV-01051-SAB (PC), 2017 WL
5972739, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2017) (“A complaint
alleging that an officer filed a false report, by itself,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Because
the complaint fails to show that Duran integrally
participated in any unlawful conduct, the motion to dismiss
the claims against him should be granted, with leave to
amend.
C.
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