United States District Court, C.D. California
B.C., a minor, by and through his Guardian Ad Litem Christopher Coleman; and CHRISTOPHER COLEMAN, Guardian Ad Litem, Plaintiffs,
VINH S. NGO; COURTENAY NGO; BALFOUR BEATTY COMMUNITIES, LLC; and DOES, 1 through 10, Defendants.
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND CASE
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
B.C. (âPlaintiffâ), a minor, by and through his Guardian Ad
Litem, Christopher Coleman, brings this Action against Vihn
S. Ngo; Courtenay Ngo; and Balfour Beatty Communities, LLC
(collectively, âDefendantsâ) arising from a dog attack.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand (âMotionâ) [34-1]. Having reviewed all papers
submitted pertaining to this Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND
RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion.
relevant facts of this case have already been laid out by the
Court in its prior Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand (“First Remand Order”) . To orient the
discussion, the Court briefly repeats the facts here.
is a minor. First Notice of Removal, Ex. A
(“Compl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 1. He and his
Guardian Ad Litem are citizens of California. First Notice of
Removal ¶ 4. Defendant Balfour Beatty Communities, LLC
(“Balfour”) is fully owned by Balfour Beatty
Investments, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Pennsylvania. Id. Balfour
claims that Defendants Vinh S. Ngo and Courtenay Ngo
(collectively, the “Ngos”) are citizens of
Ngos kept a “chow type” dog at their residence at
the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Compl. 10 ¶
2. Balfour and the Ngos “owned, leased, managed,
supervised, maintained, and controlled the above-mentioned
premises.” Id. at 11. On December 4, 2016,
while passing by the residence, Plaintiff was attacked and
bitten multiple times by the dog. Id. at 10 ¶
3. As a result, Plaintiff suffered mental anguish and
property damage and sustained physical injuries, including
abrasions, lacerations, and permanent scarring. Id.
at 10 ¶ 4. Plaintiff needed hospital and medical care,
as well as rehabilitation. Id.
23, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Complaint  against
Defendants in Santa Barbara Superior Court. Plaintiff claims
that the Ngos are strictly liable and that all Defendants
were negligent and are liable for punitive damages.
Balfour first removed this Action  to this Court on July
6, 2018 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. On August 24,
2018, the Court ordered that the case be remanded back to the
Superior Court of California, County of Santa Barbara,
because Balfour failed to meet its burden of proving that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000 . On March 5,
2019, Balfour filed a Second Notice of Removal, claiming that
new information establishes that the Court has jurisdiction
over the case based on diversity and federal question since
the attack occurred on a federal enclave. See Second Notice
of Removal, ECF. No. 27, ¶¶ 2-4. On April 3, 2019
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion [34-1]. Balfour timely
opposed  on April 23, 2019. Plaintiff timely replied 
on April 30, 2019.
actions may be removed from state court if the federal court
has original jurisdiction. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc.
v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 (2002) (“Under the
plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove
[an] action pursuant to that provision, . . . original
subject-matter jurisdiction [must] lie in the federal
courts.”). Diversity jurisdiction exists in all civil
actions between citizens of different states where the amount
in controversy exceeds $75, 000, exclusive of interest and
costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There must be complete
diversity of citizenship, meaning “each of the
plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each
of the defendants.” Morris v. Princess Cruises,
Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)).
Federal question jurisdiction exists in “all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
burden of establishing jurisdiction falls on the party
invoking the removal statute, which is strictly construed
against removal.” Sullivan v. First Affiliated
Sec., Inc.,813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987)
(internal citations omitted). Courts resolve all ambiguities
“in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter
v. Philip Morris USA,582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.
2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,980 F.2d 564, 566
(9th Cir. 1992)). A removed case must be remanded “[i]f