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Moore v. Ali

United States District Court, E.D. California

July 2, 2019

KASHIF ALI, et al., Defendants.



         Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se. Plaintiff's motions for temporary restraining orders are before the court. As discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the motions be denied.

         I. Background

         Plaintiff is presently housed at a Conservation Fire Camp, TRCC#3, in Lewiston, California. At the time he filed this action, plaintiff was housed at the California Correctional Center (“CCI”) in Susanville. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) On March 25, 2019, this action was dismissed pursuant to plaintiff's request for voluntary dismissal.

         On May 23, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate his complaint, [1] along with a motion for temporary restraining order. On May 30, 2019, plaintiff filed a second motion for temporary restraining order. In his motions, plaintiff asks the court to order defendants to advance plaintiff's release date from March 5, 2020, to January 12, 2020. (ECF No. 6 at 3.)

         II. Plaintiff's Complaint

         Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, defendants updated plaintiff's medical records to state he has seizures: (a) despite no current evidence that plaintiff suffers from a seizure disorder or has been prescribed medication for the same;[2](b) despite the fact that seizure precautions were removed from plaintiff's records on July 12, 2018, and (c) despite plaintiff refusing medical treatment by signing a refusal of treatment form. Defendants' actions resulted in plaintiff being returned prematurely from, and delayed in his transfer to, a fire camp where he can earn more time credits and make a higher salary, and ultimately resulting in his prison release date being extended beyond January 12, 2020. (ECF No. 1 at 10, 17, 21.) In addition, medical records demonstrate plaintiff has been free from pharmacological intervention for 18 months, also making him eligible for fire camp. Thus, defendants are employing “underground regulations” in violation of prison regulations, because the “CCC Clinical Camp Guidelines” are merely a Microsoft word document devoid of any legal citation or signature, not adopted by the California Office of Administrative Law, and therefore unenforceable. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) If the court does not issue a temporary restraining order requiring defendants to remove the medical hold, immediately release plaintiff to fire camp, and correct his prison release date to January 12, 2020, his prison release date may be threatened.

         In his first cause of action, plaintiff claims his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights have been violated by defendants imposing unwanted medical treatment on him without his consent, and depriving him of his right to refuse medical treatment, and violating his right to privacy in his medical records. In his second cause of action, plaintiff appears to allege that defendants retaliated against plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment by providing inaccurate responses to, and falsely denying, plaintiff's administrative appeals, imposing invalid guidelines, and making retaliatory threats against plaintiff. In addition to declaratory relief and monetary damages, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring defendants Ali and Villa to stop imposing an underground regulation, the “CCC Clinical Camp Guidelines, ” remove the medical hold and clear plaintiff for “full duty special skills nunc pro tunc from . . . August 13, 2018, to only follow valid CCHCS/CDCR policies and procedures, honor plaintiff's right to refuse treatment, right to informed consent, privacy rights, and to not retaliate against plaintiff for filing this complaint, and send [plaintiff] back to Trinity River Conservation Camp #3.” (ECF No. 1 at 28.)

         III. Motions for Temporary Restraining Order

         A. Standards

         A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure of relief that a federal court may impose without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the movant “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1)(A). The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is essentially the same as that for issuing a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is “substantially identical”).

         “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20 (citations omitted). An injunction may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation omitted).

         Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for preliminary injunctive relief, the court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an actual case or controversy. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If the court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in question. Id. Further, requests for prospective relief are limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires that the court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.”

         Finally, the pendency of an action does not give the court jurisdiction over prison officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491-93 (2009); Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The court's jurisdiction is limited to the parties in this action and to the viable legal claims ...

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