United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER ON PETITIONER'S 28 U.S.C. § 2241
PETITION (DOC. NO. 616)
March 16, 2006, pursuant to a plea bargain, Petitioner pled
guilty to violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 2, 841, and
846, conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess
methamphetamine. See Doc. Nos. 403, 405. On January
22, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 210 months in
custody and 60 months of supervised release. See
Doc. Nos. 496, 501. It appears that Petitioner's
projected release date is July 19, 2019, although there is a
detainer on Petitioner.
7, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 seeking application of the First Step Act. See
Doc. No. 616. Petitioner contends that with the application
the First Step Act's good time credits, his release date
passed in May 2019. See id.
10, 2019, the Court ordered the United States to file a
response. See Doc. No. 617. On June 25, 2019, the
United States filed an opposition to Petitioner's
petition. See Doc. No. 618.
2, 2019, Petitioner filed a reply. See Doc. No. 619.
Court cannot find that relief is appropriate. At the time
Petitioner filed his petition, he was (and remains)
incarcerated in Natchez, Mississippi. However, the district
court that encompasses the petitioner's place of
incarceration is the proper court for a § 2241 petition.
Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir.
2006) (“[A] § 2241 petition must be filed
in the district where the petitioner is in custody.”)
(emphasis added); Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d
861, 865 (9t h Cir. 2000) (“[A] habeas petition filed
pursuant to § 2241 must be heard in the custodial court
(here, the Eastern District), even if the § 2241
petition contests the legality of a sentence by falling under
the savings clause. . . . If [the] petition falls under the
savings clause so as to be a petition pursuant to §
2241, then only the Eastern District has
jurisdiction.”); United States v. Giddings,
740 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Any habeas petition
in this case must be addressed to the district court in the
district where appellant is confined.”); Brown v.
United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1980)
(“Because Brown is confined in the federal penitentiary
in Leavenworth, Kansas, any complaints he has against the
parole authorities must be addressed to the district court in
the district of his confinement.”). Therefore, this
Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's § 2241
indicates that the Court should transfer this case and grant
him an interim release. The Court finds that it is not in the
interest of justice to grant either of these requests.
Plaintiff is subject to a detainer, presumably by ICE. The
presence of the detainer strongly counsels against an interim
§ 102(b)(1) of the First Step Act provides inter
alia for an increase of good time credits up to 54 days
for each year of the imposed sentence. Section 102(b)(2),
entitled “Effective Date, ” reads that
“amendments made by this subsection shall take effect
beginning on the date that the Attorney General completes and
releases the risk and needs assessment system under
subchapter D of chapter 229 of title 18, United States Code,
as added by section 101(a) of this Act.” Section
102(b)(2)'s reference to “this subsection”
clearly encompasses § 102(b)(1). Therefore, as this
Court has previously held, the 54 day good time credit
increase is not yet effective, and will not be effective
until about July 19, 2019. See Turnquist v. United
States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41857 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14,
2019) (citing United States v. Watts,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38020, *3-*4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11,
2019)). Other courts have reached the same conclusion.
E.g. United States v. Morales, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
109359, *1-*2 (D. Ariz. June 27, 2019); United States v.
Sarachandran, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109104, *3-*5 (E.D.
NY. June 20, 2019); United States v. Yates, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68229, *6-*7 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 2019) (and
cases cited); Christopher v. Wilson, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66020, *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2019); Schmutzler v.
Quintana, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26433, *4 (E.D. Ky. Feb.
20, 2019). It is quite telling that Petitioner cites no cases
that have accepted his interpretation of the First Step Act.
Given the plain language of the First Step Act, as well as
the overwhelming weight of authority that rejects
Petitioner's position, the Court will not stray from its
conclusion in Turnquist. Petitioner is ineligible
for the First Step Act's 54 day good time credit because
that provision is not yet in effect. Given that Petitioner
seeks relief under a provision of the First Step Act that is
not in effect, neither an interim release or a transfer (or
any other relief) is warranted or “in the interests of
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, Petitioner's motion for habeas
corpus relief (Doc. No. 616) is DENIED.