United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND RE: DKT. NO.
VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Maria Anguiano moves to remand this action on the ground that
the Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. No.
17. The Court heard oral argument on Ms. Anguiano's
motion on June 25, 2019. Dkt. No. 28.
parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Dkt.
Nos. 12, 13. Having considered the parties' moving papers
and arguments made at the hearing, the Court grants Ms.
Anguiano's motion to remand.
Anguiano works as a laborer in defendant Mann Packing Co.,
Inc.'s (“Mann Packing”) foodservice plant.
Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 8. She has worked for Mann Packing since
October 19, 1995. Id. Ms. Anguiano says that
throughout her employment, Mann Packing often assigned her
multiple job duties and paid her at different rates based on
the tasks performed. Id. ¶ 22. When she worked
overtime, Mann Packing did not correctly calculate her
overtime wages, which should have been based on an average of
the regular rates of pay that she received during that pay
period. Id. As a result of that miscalculation, Ms.
Anguiano was not paid overtime wages at the correct rate of
pay, and her wage statements did not list the correct rate of
pay for overtime wages. Id.
Anguiano also says that she was required to pick up her
paycheck and wage statements during her meal breaks, which
deprived her of the full meal break period. Id.
Additionally, she says she was not provided with a duty-free
rest break of at least 10 minutes for shifts of 3.5 hours or
March 20, 2019, Ms. Anguiano filed a class action lawsuit in
state court asserting the following claims: (1) failure to
pay overtime wages for hours worked in violation of
California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194; (2) failure
to provide off-duty meal periods in violation of California
Labor Code §§ 226.7, 1174, 1198, and 1199; (3)
failure to provide off-duty rest periods in violation of
California Labor Code § 226.7; (4) failure to provide
accurate itemized wage statements in violation of California
Labor Code § 226; (5) unfair business practices in
violation of California Business and Professions Code §
17200 et seq.; and (6) damages for the above violations of
the California Labor Code under the Private Attorneys General
Act of 2004, California Labor Code § 2698 et seq. Dkt.
No. 1-1 ¶¶ 29-58.
Packing removed the action to federal court on April 19,
2019, asserting federal question jurisdiction based on
preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 185.
Dkt. No. 1. The LMRA provides for federal question
jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization” that
represents certain eligible employees. 28 U.S.C. §
185(a). In its notice of removal, Mann Packing alleges that,
during the relevant time period, Ms. Anguiano and Mann
Packing's other non-exempt employees were subject to a
valid collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) and
that Ms. Anguiano's claims depend on an analysis of that
Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2; Dkt. No. 2, Ex. A.
removal, Ms. Anguiano filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No.
19. However, for purposes of this motion, the Court considers
only the complaint as it existed at the time of removal.
Wisconsin Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S.
381, 390 (1998) (citing St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v.
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 291 (1938)).
is proper where the federal courts have original jurisdiction
over an action brought in state court. 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). Courts strictly construe the removal statute against
removal. E.g., Provincial Gov't of
Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087
(9th Cir. 2009); Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008).
“A defendant seeking removal has the burden to
establish that removal is proper and any doubt is resolved
against removability.” Luther, 533 F.3d at
1034 (citation omitted); see also Moore-Thomas v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[A]ny doubt about the right of removal requires
resolution in favor of remand.”).
28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have original
jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States.”
“In determining the existence of removal jurisdiction,
based upon a federal question, the court must look to the
complaint as of the time the removal petition was
filed. Jurisdiction is based on the complaint as
originally filed and not as amended.” Abada v.
Charles Schwab & Co., 300 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir.
2002) (quoting O'Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856
F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Removal pursuant to
section 1331 is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint
rule, ” which provides that federal question
jurisdiction “exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded
complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. 386, 392 (1987). There exists, however, an
“independent corollary” to the well-pleaded
complaint rule, known as the doctrine of complete preemption.
Id. at 393 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1,
22 (1983)). Through complete preemption, certain
“extraordinary” federal statutes “convert
an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a
federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint
rule.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58, 65 (1987). LMRA section 301 is a federal statute
with complete preemptive force: if the statutory criteria are
met, section 301 will completely preempt claims that are pled
exclusively as state law causes of action. See
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.
issue before this Court is whether LMRA section 301 preempts
Ms. Anguiano's state law claims such that original
federal question jurisdiction exists to support the removal
of this case from state court.
section 301 completely preempts only claims “founded
directly on rights created by collective-bargaining
agreements” or “‘substantially dependent on
analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.'”
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 395 (quoting Elec.
Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3 (1987)). It is
not enough that the “state law cause of action is
conditioned on some term or condition of employment that was
collectively bargained.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 916 (9th Cir. ...