United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT
D. WGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pamela Day seeks entry of default judgment against Defendant
Dustin Boyer. (Appl. for Default J. (“Appl.”),
ECF No. 15.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court
Pamela Day initiated this action against Defendant Dustin
Boyer on March 7, 2019. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Day asserts a
dozen claims against Boyer for violations of federal
securities law and state law related to a cryptocurrency
investment she made with Boyer in December
2017. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3-10.)
On May 13, 2019, on Day's request, the Clerk entered
default against Boyer. (Req. for Clerk to Enter Default, ECF
No. 12; Default by Clerk, ECF No. 13.) Following the
Court's Order to Show Cause, Day filed the instant
Application for Default Judgment against Boyer. (See
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b) authorizes
a district court to grant a default judgment after the Clerk
enters default under Rule 55(a). Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b). Before a
court can enter a default judgment against a defendant, the
plaintiff must satisfy the procedural requirements set forth
in Rules 54(c) and 55, as well as Local Rules 55-1 and 55-2.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c), 55; C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-1, 55-2. Local Rule
55-1 requires that the movant submit a declaration
establishing: (1) when and against which party default was
entered; (2) identification of the pleading to which default
was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is a minor,
incompetent person, or active service member; (4) that the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3931, does
not apply; and that (5) the defaulting party was properly
served with notice, if required under Rule 55(b)(2). C.D.
Cal. L.R. 55-1.
these procedural requirements are satisfied, a district court
has discretion to enter default judgment. Aldabe v.
Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). “[A]
defendant's default does not automatically entitle the
plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo,
Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D.
Cal 2002). In exercising discretion, a court must consider
several factors (the “Eitel Factors”):
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the
merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the
sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake
in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning
material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable
neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.
1986) (emphasis added). Generally, after the Clerk enters
default, the defendant's liability is conclusively
established, and the well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint are accepted as true, except those pertaining to
damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826
F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th
does not comply entirely with the relevant procedural
requirements and does not address the Eitel factors
at all. Day thus fails to establish that entry of default
judgment is appropriate.
complies with most of the procedural requirements for entry
of default judgment. With her Application, she submits the
Declaration of Jim Bauch (“Bauch Declaration”)
which states that the Clerk entered Default against Boyer on
May 13, 2019, as to the Complaint. (Bauch Decl. ¶¶
2, 4, ECF No. 15-1.) Day also submits her own declaration
(“Day Declaration”), which states that
“Boyer is not a minor or incompetent person, and to the
best of [Day's] knowledge, is not in military service or
otherwise exempted under the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940.” (Day Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No.
15-2.) However, although the record in this action does not
reflect Boyer's appearance, neither declaration indicates
whether Day ...