United States District Court, C.D. California
MANUEL P. DOMINGO, Plaintiff,
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA; et al., Defendant.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER ; AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT
D. WRIGHT, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Manuel P. Domingo, appearing pro se, filed his Complaint on
July 8, 2019, against various Defendants. (Compl., ECF No.
1.) From what the Court can discern, Plaintiff is seeking to
prevent Defendants from foreclosing on his business property
located at 856 Kuhua Street, Lahaina, Hawaii 96761. (Compl.
¶¶ 3, 48, 52.) Plaintiff did not file an
application for a temporary restraining order as required by
Local Rule 65-1. Instead, Plaintiff's Complaint seeks a
temporary restraining order as his fifth cause of action.
(Compl. ¶¶ 87-92.)
on the Court's review of the Complaint and related
pleadings, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's
request for a temporary restraining order and
DISMISSES THIS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
owned and operated a business located at 856 Kuhua Street,
Lahaina, Hawaii 96761 (the “Subject Property”).
(Compl. ¶ 3.) Based on the Complaint, the Court cannot
ascertain with certainty each Defendants' relationship to
Plaintiff. However, it appears that Defendants are banks that
issued the original loan, serviced the loan, or engaged or
assisted in the assignment of the loan. (See Compl.
¶¶ 4-9, 17-19.)
unclear what led to the instant lawsuit and whether
Defendants have attempted to foreclose on the Subject
Property. Nonetheless, Plaintiff “dispute[s]
Defendants' superior colorable claim to legal title and
equitable title of the [Subject Property].” (Compl.
¶ 13.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that “an actual
controversy has arisen and now exists between the Plaintiff
and Defendants . . . [and] Plaintiff desire[s] a judicial
determination and declaration of its rights about the
[Subject] Property and the corresponding Tangible Note and
Deed of Trust.” (Compl. ¶ 27.)
on these allegations, Plaintiff brings six causes of action:
(1) lack of standing/wrongful foreclosure; (2) breach of
contract; (3) quiet title; (4) slander of title; (5)
temporary restraining order and injunctive relief; and (6)
declaratory relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 50-96.)
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
courts have subject matter jurisdiction only as authorized by
the Constitution and Congress. U.S. Const. art. III, §
2, cl. 1; see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts have
original jurisdiction where an action arises under federal
law or where each plaintiff's citizenship is diverse from
each defendant's citizenship and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary
rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citation omitted).
Federal courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their
jurisdictional power and “are obliged to inquire sua
sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal
jurisdiction.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977).
Temporary Restraining Order
application for a temporary restraining order involves the
invocation of a drastic remedy which a court of equity
ordinarily does not grant, unless a very strong showing is
made of a necessity and desirability of such action.”
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103
F.Supp. 978, 980 (D.D.C. 1952). The standard for issuing a
temporary restraining order is “substantially
identical” to that for issuing a ...