United States District Court, E.D. California
M. COTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending
before the court is plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1).
court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants
who have been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this
screening provision, the court must dismiss a complaint or
portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2)
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or
(3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(A), (B). Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this court must dismiss an action
if the court determines that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. Because plaintiff has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, the court will screen the
complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Pursuant to Rule
12(h)(3), the court will also consider as a threshold matter
whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.
names the following as defendants: (1) Tom Bosenko, the
Sheriff of Shasta County; (2) Roger Moore, the Chief of
Police for the City of Redding; (3) Jim Milestone, the former
Superintendent of the Whiskeytown National Recreation Area;
(4) the Shasta Inter-Agency Narcotics Task Force; (5) Leonard
Moty, a member of the Shasta County Board of Supervisors; (6)
Lester Baugh, a member of the Shasta County Board of
Supervisors; (7) the California Highway Patrol; and (8) the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration.
I was initially named in Benno et al v Shasta County as a
plaintiff. I have previously communicated in letter from with
this court on this matter. I have experienced the same type
of harassments and stalking as the individuals named in the
above referenced suit. The city and county agencies within
Shasta County jurisdiction named in this document have a long
history and behaviors associated with the subversion of
California state law as well as federal law. Th[e] individual
incidents, dates, and personnel involved are too numerous to
mention in brief. I could name other agencies including
Shasta County Planning Division Code Enforcement however this
and other entities have been engaged at request defendants.
* * *
Ongoing warrantless use of electronic(s) surveillance
including cell phone, laptop computer and vehicle by cellular
radio, ongoing physical police stalking and harassment,
denunciation through propaganda and civilian
inter-relationship practices, subversion of California state
law, federal congressional mandates and provisions concerning
“medical cannabis patients following state law”
and illegitimate expenditures of federal resources including
annual DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) stipends
contract. I have lived at my current residence for over six
years. This police harassment began in November 2009 and
continues through present. Last known incident approximately
June 6, 2019.
* * *
I am a PTSD patient, result of childhood trauma, physical,
verbal, emotional abuse. The defendants behavior has
exaserbated [sic] my condition for years. I ask that a jury
consider damages. Compensation monetary or other. I wish the
court to order defendants to cease and desist further
activities described without a court ordered warrant based on
reasonable probable cause indicating a crime or criminal
activity. A decade of consistant [sic] incidents outside the
law for the sake of political agenda by law enforcement and
their supervisors perpetuated upon myself and others is
difficult to fathom in a compensatory parameter.
considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court
must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint
as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94
(2007). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp.
Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740
(1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th
Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also
be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally
conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual
allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). In addition, pro
se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972).
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief” in order to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to
survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint
must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual
allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56.
The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted