Staffin v. Bosenko

          ORDER

          DENNIS M. COTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the court is plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1).

         The court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this screening provision, the court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B). Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this court must dismiss an action if the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court will screen the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), the court will also consider as a threshold matter whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.

         I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

         Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Tom Bosenko, the Sheriff of Shasta County; (2) Roger Moore, the Chief of Police for the City of Redding; (3) Jim Milestone, the former Superintendent of the Whiskeytown National Recreation Area; (4) the Shasta Inter-Agency Narcotics Task Force; (5) Leonard Moty, a member of the Shasta County Board of Supervisors; (6) Lester Baugh, a member of the Shasta County Board of Supervisors; (7) the California Highway Patrol; and (8) the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.

         Plaintiff claims:

I was initially named in Benno et al v Shasta County as a plaintiff. I have previously communicated in letter from with this court on this matter. I have experienced the same type of harassments and stalking as the individuals named in the above referenced suit. The city and county agencies within Shasta County jurisdiction named in this document have a long history and behaviors associated with the subversion of California state law as well as federal law. Th[e] individual incidents, dates, and personnel involved are too numerous to mention in brief. I could name other agencies including Shasta County Planning Division Code Enforcement however this and other entities have been engaged at request defendants.

         * * *

Ongoing warrantless use of electronic(s) surveillance including cell phone, laptop computer and vehicle by cellular radio, ongoing physical police stalking and harassment, denunciation through propaganda and civilian inter-relationship practices, subversion of California state law, federal congressional mandates and provisions concerning “medical cannabis patients following state law” and illegitimate expenditures of federal resources including annual DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) stipends contract. I have lived at my current residence for over six years. This police harassment began in November 2009 and continues through present. Last known incident approximately June 6, 2019.

         * * *

I am a PTSD patient, result of childhood trauma, physical, verbal, emotional abuse. The defendants behavior has exaserbated [sic] my condition for years. I ask that a jury consider damages. Compensation monetary or other. I wish the court to order defendants to cease and desist further activities described without a court ordered warrant based on reasonable probable cause indicating a crime or criminal activity. A decade of consistant [sic] incidents outside the law for the sake of political agenda by law enforcement and their supervisors perpetuated upon myself and others is difficult to fathom in a compensatory parameter.

         II. DISCUSSION

         In considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted ...