United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER: 1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS [ECF NO. 2] AND 2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILING
TO STATE A CLAIM AND FOR SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES AGAINST
IMMUNE DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2) AND
ANTHONY J. BATTAGLIA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Guy Orlando Williamson, a state inmate currently housed at
the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (âRJDâ) located
in San Diego, California has filed a civil rights Complaint
(âCompl.â) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1983. (ECF No. 1) In
addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis (âIFPâ) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Â§ 1915(a). (ECF No.
Plaintiff's IFP Motion
parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a
district court of the United States, except an application
for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The
action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to
prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed
IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v.
Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007);
Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir.
1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to proceed
IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in
“increments” or “installments, ”
Bruce v. Samuels, __ S.Ct. __, 136 S.Ct. 627, 629
(U.S. 2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185
(9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is
ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d
844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to
submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account
statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month
period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v.
King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the
certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an
initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in
the account for the past six months, or (b) the average
monthly balance in the account for the past six months,
whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner
then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the
preceding month's income, in any month in which his
account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court
until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.
support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a
certified prison trust account statement pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2.
See ECF No. 3 at 2-3; Andrews, 398 F.3d at
1119. This certificate shows that Plaintiff had an available
balance of $0.00 at the time of filing. Therefore, the Court
will not assess Plaintiff an initial partial filing fee
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event
shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action
or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the
reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which
to pay the initial partial filing fee.”);
Bruce, 136 S.Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d
at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a
“safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a
prisoner's IFP case based solely on a “failure to
pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when
payment is ordered.”).
the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, declines to
“exact” the an initial partial filing fee because
his prison certificate shows he “has no means to pay
it, ” Bruce, 136 S.Ct. at 629, and directs the
Secretary for the CDCR to collect the entire $350 balance of
the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward
them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment
payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)
Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint
requires a pre-Answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the
Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint,
or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are
immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004
(9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
“The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that
the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the
expense of responding.'” Nordstrom v.
Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d
680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a
claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112
(9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680
F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening
pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar
standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule
12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct”
or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me
accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
42 U.S.C. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two
essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and
(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442
F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).