Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Doe v. City of Berkeley

United States District Court, N.D. California

July 15, 2019

JANE DOE, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF BERKELEY, et al., Defendants.

          ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND RE: DKT. NO. 10

          SUSAN ILLSTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Before the Court is a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint filed by defendant City of Berkeley. Plaintiff claims her rights under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) were violated when she received a citation from defendant City of Berkeley and her car was towed by defendant Berry Brothers Towing Company. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing set for August 23, 2019. The Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

         BACKGROUND

         On March 29, 2019, plaintiff, Jane Doe, filed her complaint in Alameda County Superior Court. Dkt. No. 1-1. On April 15, 2019, defendant City of Berkeley removed the action to this Court. Dkt. No. 1.

         The complaint alleges that plaintiff's rights under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act were violated when (1) the City of Berkeley issued a citation for Jane Doe's car being parked for more than 72 hours and (2) defendant Berry Brothers Towing Company towed her car. Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶5. The complaint also alleges plaintiffs' rights under the ADA were violated because Jane Doe does not have “full and equal access to public roads and use of her car by the wrongful towing of her car.” Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 6. The complaint fails to include any identifying information for Jane Doe and does not include any details regarding Jane Doe's alleged disability.

         LEGAL STANDARD

         Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics, ” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.

         In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must assume that the plaintiff's allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).

         Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court has an obligation to “construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the [plaintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, pro se pleadings must still allege facts sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine whether a claim has been stated. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend.

         DISCUSSION

         I. Plaintiff's ADA & Rehabilitation Act Claims

         To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) she was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of her disability. O'Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007).

         Similarly, to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege: (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3) she was denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of her disability; and (4) the program receives federal financial assistance. Id.

         Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims fail for several reasons. First, plaintiff has not established that she is disabled. Rather, she summarily states she is a “person with a disability who owns a ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.