United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS RE: DKT. NOS. 83,
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
LaTonya R. Finley (“Plaintiff”), proceeding
pro se, alleged that Defendants Trans Union, LLC
(“Trans Union”), Equifax Information Services LLC
(“Equifax”), Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
(“Experian”), Plaza Services, LLC
(“Plaza”), and Southwest Credit Systems, L.P.
(“Southwest”) violated the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et
seq., and related state laws. See Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Dkt. No. 82.
five Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC. See Dkt.
Nos. 83, 84, 85. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's
opposition, Dkt. No. 87, Defendants' replies, Dkt. Nos.
86, 88, 89, 90, and Plaintiff's supplemental memorandum,
Dkt. No. 91. The Court held a hearing on the motions,
see Dkt. No. 98, at which it explained that
Plaintiff's amended complaint failed to plead facts
sufficient to support her claims but said that it would allow
Plaintiff one more opportunity to amend her complaint.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motions to
dismiss with leave to amend.
First Motions to Dismiss
February 26, 2019, the Court granted Defendants' motions
to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff had failed to meet the
pleading standard. See Dkt. No. 80. The Court
granted leave to amend and reminded Plaintiff that “she
must provide specific facts to support each of her causes of
action” and should “clearly distinguish between
Defendants in her complaint.” Id. at 10. For
example, the Court advised Plaintiff that “she should
provide specific facts about what the alleged debt is, how
the information in her credit file is inaccurate, how she
disputed the alleged debt with Defendant [Credit Report
Agencies], and whether Defendant [Credit Reporting Agencies]
provided notice of those disputes to Plaza and
Southwest.” Id. at 5.
Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint
second amended complaint contains similarly conclusory
allegations as her dismissed complaint. Compare SAC
with Dkt. No. 51. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
“furnished inaccurate information within
plaintiff's credit file for the purpose of discrediting
plaintiff's ability to pay and creating [an] inescapable
economic trap.” SAC ¶ 4. She alleges that
Southwest and Plaza “took an aggressive approach to
collect a debt in which each of these defendants knew they
were not entitled to collect” and that Experian,
Equifax, and Trans Union “without notice or
investigation, placed the inaccurate information within
plaintiff's credit file, ” thereby
“discrediting plaintiff's credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, and quality of life.” Id. ¶
5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “failed to
maintain Plaintiff's credit account with maximum
accuracy, ” id. ¶ 6, causing her
financial, mental, and emotional harm, id. ¶ 7.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” A
defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a
cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a
cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts
“accept factual allegations in the complaint as true
and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
Nonetheless, Courts do not “accept as true allegations
that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,
or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis.
Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(e). For that reason, “a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quotations marks and
citations omitted). If dismissal is still appropriate, a
court “should grant leave to amend even if no request
to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of
other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Where leave to amend is appropriate, “before dismissing
a pro se complaint the district court must provide the
litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in
order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to
amend effectively.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963
F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).
the direction provided by the Court in the prior order
granting Defendants' motions to dismiss, Plaintiff has
not added factual allegations to her complaint sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. However, based on the discussion
at the hearing and Plaintiff's proffered evidence, the
Court will allow Plaintiff one more ...