United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No.
.CYNTHIA BASHANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
2016, Plaintiffs purchased a new Range Rover from Defendant.
Plaintiffs allege that soon after the purchase, the vehicle
began exhibiting serious mechanical issues that Defendant was
unable to resolve. After requesting revocation of the sale,
which Defendant refused, Plaintiffs filed claims for breach
of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312, and California's Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”), Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 1790-1795.
moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims under
Song-Beverly. (ECF No. 17.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs
cannot bring claims under the Act because the Range Rover is
not a “new motor vehicle” as defined by
Song-Beverly. In Plaintiff Reza Paydar's case, Defendant
argues that the Range Rover is indisputably not covered by
Song-Beverly because Mr. Paydar used the vehicle for
primarily business purposes. As for Plaintiff Lightstyle
Automated Systems, Inc. (“Lightstyle”), Defendant
argues that the Range Rover is not covered by Song-Beverly
because Lightstyle currently owns more than five vehicles
registered in California. Accordingly, the Court considers
whether there is an issue of material fact as to: (1) Mr.
Paydar's use of the Range Rover, and (2) the number of
vehicles registered in Lightstyle's name during the
relevant time period.
Court finds the motion suitable for determination on the
papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following
reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN
PART Defendant's motion for partial summary
Reza Paydar is the sole owner and president of Plaintiff
Lightstyle, a business that designs and distributes lighting
for residential and commercial properties. (Joint Statement
of Undisputed Facts (“JSUF”) 2:20-23, ECF No.
October 1, 2016, Plaintiffs purchased a new 2016 Land Rover
Range Rover from Land Rover San Diego for $128, 003.40.
(Id. 2:24-3:7.) The sales contract for the vehicle
lists Lightstyle as the buyer and Mr. Paydar as the co-buyer.
(Id. 2:24-27.) Mr. Paydar filled out a purchase form
when he bought the Range Rover, and he left unchecked a box
that signals whether the vehicle is being purchased for
business use. (Id. 12:15-22.)
Range Rover is registered to Mr. Paydar and Lightstyle, at
Lightstyle's business address. (Id. 5:5-10.) Mr.
Paydar has two other vehicles registered in his name with the
California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”),
(id. 7:13-16, 9:15-19), and Lightstyle has nine
other vehicles registered in its name with the California
DMV, (id. 6:27-7:1). The Range Rover and the nine
other vehicles registered to Lightstyle are all listed on
Lightstyle's 2016 Federal Tax Return's Depreciation
Schedule. (Id. 9:23-25.)
Paydar testified the Range Rover is his primary day-to-day
vehicle. (JSUF 6:2- 5.) He testified that he drives the Range
Rover to work meetings, to visit his parents, to attend
weddings, and to go to the movies. (Id. 6:6-8,
13:7-10.) Mr. Paydar also testified that Lightstyle employees
occasionally drive the Range Rover to and from the repair
shop or to get gas. (Id. 6:15-18.)
purchasing the Range Rover, Mr. Paydar brought the vehicle to
the dealership for repair on at least nine occasions.
(Id. 12:9-12.) Eventually, on November 26, 2018,
Plaintiffs commenced this action in San Diego County Superior
Court. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiffs each bring two
claims under the Song-Beverly Act and two claims under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Id. ¶¶
20-50.) All causes of action arise out of Plaintiffs'
purchase of the allegedly defective Range Rover.
removed the action to this Court based on federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Notice of Removal
¶¶ 7-28, ECF No. 1.) Defendant now moves for
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims under
Song-Beverly. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 17-1.)
party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim
or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which
summary judgment is sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id.;
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). A fact is material when, under the governing
substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can
satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence
that negates an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving
party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an
element essential to that party's case on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at
322-23. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary ...