United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER RE: HOMEPORT INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION TO
INTERVENE RE: DKT. NO. 16
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Steven Carson filed this action in the Alameda County
Superior Court against Defendants CMA CGM (America) LLC,
Seaspan Corporation, and Seaspan Ship Management Ltd.
alleging negligence and products liability claims. Seaspan
Corporation and Seaspan Ship Management Ltd. thereafter
removed the action to this Court based on federal diversity
jurisdiction. Following removal, Homeport Insurance
Company (“Homeport”) filed an unopposed motion to
intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(Dkt. No. 16.) After carefully considering the arguments and
briefing submitted, the Court concludes that oral argument is
unnecessary, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the
August 1, 2019 hearing, and GRANTS the motion to intervene.
Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides for intervention as of
right and by permission. Under Rule 24(a)(2), a court must
permit anyone to intervene who “claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject
of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing
parties adequately represent that interest.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). Under Rule 24(b), a court may permit
anyone to intervene who “(A) is given a conditional
right to intervene by a federal statute; or (B) has a claim
or defense that shares with the main action a common question
of law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b). Homeport moves to
intervene as a matter of right, or alternatively, for
applicant seeking to intervene in a pending lawsuit “as
of right” must demonstrate that: “(1) it has a
significant protectable interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject matter of the action; (2) the
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair
or impede the applicant's ability to protect its
interest; (3) the application is timely; and (4) the existing
parties may not adequately represent the applicant's
interest.” United States v. City of Los
Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). An applicant must
satisfy all four of these requirements. Arakaki v.
Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003). In
evaluating these requirements, courts “are guided
primarily by practical and equitable considerations.”
Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir.
1998). “By allowing parties with a practical interest
in the outcome of a particular case to intervene, we often
prevent or simplify future litigation involving related
issues; at the same time, we allow an additional interested
party to express its views before the court.”
Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66
F.3d 1489, 1496 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
all four factors favor intervention. This action arises
following Plaintiff's injury while he working as a
longshoreman loading containers on a vessel owed by
Defendants. Homeport insured SSA Terminals, LLC,
Plaintiff's employer, and allegedly paid Plaintiff $77,
283.44 in workers compensation benefits as a result of his
injuries. (Dkt. No. 16-1 at ¶¶ 4-5.) Homeport seeks
reimbursement of these benefits under the Longshore and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
Homeport thus has a significant interest in the outcome of
this action wherein Plaintiff seeks damages for these same
injuries, and as a practical matter, disposition of this
action may impair Homeport's interest. See California
ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 441 (9th
Cir. 2006). Homeport's motion is timely as it was made
within three months of removal and before there was any
substantive motion practice. See Idaho Farm Bureau
Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.
1995). Further, adding Homeport as a party to this action
will not defeat diversity jurisdiction as it is a citizen of
Washington with its principal place of business in Seattle,
Washington, and all the other parties are citizens of
different states. Finally, the other parties to this action
do not share Homeport's interest as its claim for
reimbursement would lessen Plaintiffs potential recovery in
this action. See Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078,
1086 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (May 13, 2003). Accordingly,
Homeport has established a right to intervene as a matter of
right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).
on the foregoing, Homeport's unopposed motion to
intervene as a matter of right is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 16.)
Homeport shall file its complaint in intervention within 21
days of this Order.
IS SO ORDERED.
 Defendant Hapag Lloyd (America) LLC,
who was substituted for Defendant CMA CGM (America) LLC,
joined in the removal, but the claims against it were later
voluntarily dismissed. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 6; Dkt.
 All parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 6 & 7.) Homeport-not yet a
party-has not consented, but the Court may still decide the
motion to intervene. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. ...