United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT
VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
30, 2019, Petitioner Matthew Jacobs, acting pro se,
filed a ease-initiating document entitled "Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus." ("Petition," ECF No.
1.) As discussed below, summary dismissal of the action is
Petition appears on Form MC-275, a form approved by the
Judicial Council of California for habeas petitions filed in
the California courts. (See generally
Petition.) However, the Petition appears neither to
request a writ of habeas corpus nor to pertain to habeas
corpus. The Petition does not concern a conviction or
sentence sustained by Petitioner. (See Id. at 2.)
Instead, Petitioner indicates that the Petition concerns an
"Application to Forine Souverigne/Diversith-
cittz/Nattonality," and the relief he requests is to
become a foreign national and be deported to the Russian
Federation. (Id. at 2-3.) Petitioner acknowledges
that the Petition "is a matter other than a standard or
usual court matter," and avers that he is "not sure
if there is any lower grounds or forms to begign [sic] this
process of filing for my citizenship." (Id. at
checked a box on Form MC-275 indicating he is in custody
pursuant to a criminal conviction (see id at 2), but
Petitioner apparently is not presently incarcerated.
Petitioner's institution of incarceration is "Orange
County." (Id.) Petitioner's address of
record is a street address in Orange, California. (See id
THE PETITION IS SUBJECT TO SUMMARY DISMISSAL
of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts requires summary dismissal of federal
habeas petitions "[i]f it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court." See
also CD. Cal. L.R. 72-3.2 (authorizing a magistrate
judge to prepare a proposed order for summary dismissal and
proposed judgment for a district judge).
the Petition must be dismissed because Petitioner has not
shown he is in custody. A federal court may grant relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to "a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court."
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). The "in
custody" requirement is a jurisdictional one. See
Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2005).
"[O]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has
completely expired, the collateral consequences of that
conviction are not in themselves sufficient to render an
individual 'in custody' for the purposes of a habeas
attack upon it" Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488,
492 (1989); accord Resendiz, 416 F.3d at 956
("[F]ederal courts lack jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petitions unless the petitioner is 'under the conviction
or sentence under attack at the time his petition is
filed."' (quoting Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490-
Petitioner checks a box on Form MC-275 indicating that he is
in custody pursuant to a criminal conviction (see
Petition at 2), the Petition indicates the contrary.
(See, e.g., id at 1 (providing civilian street
address as mailing address); id at 2 (noting
institution of incarceration as "Orange County");
id. at 3 (mentioning living in Humboldt County and
the City of Orange); id (noting encounters with
police officers in public places and allegedly improper
detentions without identifying any period of incarceration).)
Petitioner does not allege that he is presently incarcerated;
though he states an expected release date, he does not
indicate the date he was convicted, the date he was
sentenced, or the length of his sentence. (See Id.
at 2.) Although one person appears in the results for this
Court's search of Petitioner's name in the inmate
locator website of the California Department of Corrections,
that inmate is not the same age as the Petitioner.
Compare Inmate Information, CDCR Inmate Locator,
(last visited June 20, 2019) (32-year-old inmate),
with Petition at 2 ("I'm 41 now!").
The Court concludes that it plainly appears from the face of
the Petition that Petitioner is not in custody and,
therefore, is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
Accordingly, dismissal is appropriate on that fact alone.
Petitioner does not seek cognizable habeas relief. A habeas
corpus action necessarily entails a challenge to either a
conviction or a sentence imposed by a state-court judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a federal court
"shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States"); see also Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). When success on a
petitioner's claims "would not necessarily lead to
his immediate or earlier release from confinement,"
those claims do not fall within the "core of habeas
corpus." Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 935
(9th Cir. 2016) (en bane). If a claim "does not lie at
'the core of habeas corpus, "' then "it may
not be brought in habeas corpus" Id. at 934
(quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487).
despite the form of the Petition, Petitioner casts the
Petition as an "Application to Forine
Souverigne/Diversith-citiz/Nationality." (Petition at 2
(errors preserved).) Petitioner acknowledges that
"[t]his is a matter other than a standard or usual court
matter" (Petition at 2.) The thrust of Petitioner's
claim is that he is being stalked and harassed by "gang
stalkers" and other surveillance measures by the
Department of Homeland Security. (Id. at 2-3.) The
Court interprets Petitioner's request for relief as
seeking to become a sovereign foreign national citizen and be
deported to the Russian Federation. (Id. at 3.) He
makes several other unsubstantiated requests for relief that
bear no relation to habeas. (See, e.g., Id. at 2
(requesting a Freedom of Information Act transcript);
id. at 5 (requesting "relief from indentured
Petitioner does not identify a criminal judgment he
challenges. Although Petitioner narrates some encounters and
allegedly improper detentions by law enforcement (see
Id. at 3), describes his attempts to pursue his rights
in court (see id at 5-6), and checks a box on Form
MC-275 indicating he is in custody pursuant to a criminal
conviction (see id at 2), Petitioner does not answer
the form's questions regarding the sentencing or
committing charges and the sentencing or committing court,
nor does he appear to challenge any judgment (see
id). Petitioner requests no form of relief that this
Court may grant through a writ of habeas corpus. See
Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935. Therefore, because no federal
habeas relief is requested, it plainly appears from the face
of the Petition that Petitioner is not entitled to federal
the Petition is frivolous. Summary dismissal of a habeas
petition is appropriate where the allegations in the petition
are vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently
frivolous or false. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d
490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990).
as generously as this Court can interpret the Petition,
Petitioner's allegations are patently frivolous.
Petitioner asserts that he has been stalked and harassed for
decades through a counterintelligence program controlled by
the Department of Homeland Security. (See Petition
at 2.) He alleges that gang stalkers, the Orange Police
Department, and a large, trained rat all have been employed
in surveillance efforts targeting him. (See id at
3.) Through his Petition he seeks to apply to become a
foreign national so that he may be deported to Russia.
(See id at 3.) He seeks to avoid having his property
and estate being lost at sea and then salvaged by the
Superior Court, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund. (See id at 5.) As discussed above,
Petitioner's allegations are far removed from the realm
of federal habeas corpus; they cannot be untangled and
deciphered coherently into a challenge to a state-court
conviction or sentence on the basis of a constitutional
violation. The frivolity of the Petition subjects it to
dismissal. Cf, e.g., Turner v. Sullivan, No. CV
17-5903-PA (JPR), 2017 U.S. Dist. TEXIS 140178 (CD. Cal. Aug.
29, 2017) (summarily dismissing action as frivolous where
"conclusory and nonsensical" claims could not be