United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
February 13, 2019, Plaintiffs Andrea Jones, as an individual
and as the Guardian ad Litem for her minor son, A.H., brought
this action against Defendants City of Oakland, Oakland
Police Department (“OPD”), and Oakland Police
Officer Harold Castro, in his individual and official
capacities. Dkt. No. 3. On February 21, 2019, Plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 8 (“FAC”).
Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss
the amended complaint, briefing for which is complete. Dkt.
Nos. 21 (“Mot.”), 22 (“Opp.”), 26
(“Reply”). After carefully considering the
parties' arguments, the Court GRANTS
case involves an undisputedly disturbing incident that
occurred in 2017. Plaintiffs are African American and at all
relevant times resided in Oakland, California next to Jesse
Enjaian, an unnamed party. FAC ¶ 16. Mr. Enjaian is
alleged to have been mentally unstable, possessed firearms at
his residence, and was prone to violence against his
neighbors. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs' claims
arise out of Defendants' actions in response to a series
of Mr. Enjaian's violent outbursts over the course of
seven days. See Id. ¶¶ 18-46.
on February 10, 2017, Mr. Enjaian “shot at and
destroyed a parked vehicle in front of Plaintiff Jones'
residence.” Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiffs allege
that Mr. Enjaian targeted the vehicle because it belonged to
an African American man. Id. ¶¶ 20-21.
That evening, Plaintiff Jones spoke with Oakland Police
Officers regarding the incident and provided them with Mr.
Enjaian's name and phone number. Id. ¶ 24.
The following morning, Plaintiff Jones saw Mr. Enjaian in his
backyard and called OPD to inform them of Mr. Enjaian's
location. Id. ¶ 26. Two officers responded to
the call in full police uniforms and parked their police
vehicles in front of Plaintiff Jones' driveway.
Id. Mr. Enjaian purportedly “became
enraged” upon witnessing Plaintiff Jones speak with the
officers on her front porch and inside her front door.
Id. The officers approached Mr. Enjaian, but he
“refused to speak with the officers and instructed them
to get off of his property.” Id.
February 13, 2017, Plaintiff Jones observed Mr. Enjaian
standing outside her home, firing a rifle at oncoming
traffic. Id. ¶ 28. The next day, Mr. Enjaian
shot at a vehicle occupied by an African American man and
later yelled racial slurs at the man. Id.
¶¶ 30-31. On February 15, 2017, Plaintiff Jones
reported both shooting incidents to OPD and at that time met
with Defendant Castro, the assigned primary investigator.
Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Plaintiff Jones shared that
she feared for her and her son's lives. Id.
¶ 36. Defendant Castro advised Plaintiff Jones to
install security cameras on her property, that OPD was
“going to get a warrant, ” and that OPD
“had what they needed” to arrest Mr. Enjaian.
Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
following day, Plaintiff Jones called Defendant Castro after
seeing Mr. Enjaian in his backyard, in response to which
Officer Castro stated that OPD was “taking care of it,
” and that Mr. Enjaian's arrest was a
“priority.” Id. ¶¶ 39-40.
Finally, on February 17, 2017, Mr. Enjaian “opened fire
on Plaintiffs' residence and vehicle.” Id.
¶ 43. OPD ultimately shot and killed Mr. Enjaian.
Id. ¶ 45.
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a) requires
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to
dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint
lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to
support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v.
Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir.
2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts
“accept factual allegations in the complaint as true
and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
Nonetheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations
that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,
or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis.
Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d
979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court also need not accept as
true allegations that contradict matter properly subject to
judicial notice or allegations contradicting the exhibits
attached to the complaint. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at
court concludes that a 12(b)(6) motion should be granted, the
“court should grant leave to amend even if no request
to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of
other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
brings claims against Officer Castro under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (“Section 1983”) for purported violations of
their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. FAC ¶¶ 47-57. Plaintiffs further bring a
Monell claim against the City of Oakland and OPD.
Id. ¶¶ 58- 60; Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Defendants move to dismiss each cause of action.