Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Bell v. Martinez

United States District Court, C.D. California, Western Division

August 27, 2019

RAYMOND BELL, Petitioner,
v.
FELIPE MARTINEZ JR., Respondent.

         Adopting the R & R in Part; Granting in Part Doc 12 (Mot. to Dismiss) Denying Doc 2 (Mot. to Red. Sentence)

         Denying the Petition for Lack of Merit; Directing the Entry of Separate Judgment; Dismissing the Action With Prejudice; Terminating the Case (JS-6)

          ORDER

         Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the habeas corpus petition, the records on file, the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), and the applicable law. Neither party objected to the R&R or sought an extension of the objection deadline.

         The R&R recommends that the Court decline to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust prison remedies (Doc 14 at 4-5). The Court agrees that the exhaustion requirement should be waived due to futility and will adopt the R&R to that extent.

         The Magistrate Judge further recommends that this Court dismiss the habeas petition without prejudice on the ground that petitioner's habeas claims are not constitutionally and prudentially ripe for court adjudication, see Doc 14 at 6-10. Subsequently issued Ninth Circuit precedent prevents the Court from adopting this portion of the R&R. In July 2019, just weeks after the R&R issued, the Circuit issued Bottinelli v. Salazar, 929 F.3d 1196');">929 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming the denial of federal prisoners' section 2241 habeas petition contending that this amendment to the goodtime-credit provision required BOP to re-calculate their sentences immediately).

         In the wake of Bottinelli, a Ninth Circuit district court confronted with this claim regarding the effective date of this First Step Act amendment

need not independently analyze this question of statutory interpretation, because the Ninth Circuit settled the matter . . . . In Bottinelli, the Court of Appeals denied the joint petition of eight federal inmates, and held that the First Step Act's ‘goodtime fix' is not immediately effective but is subject to the effective-date provision. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's arguments based on the language and structure of the statute, [929 F.3d at 1198-1201], and those based on constitutional considerations, [929 F.3d at 1201-02]. The opinion thus forecloses all the arguments the petitioner makes here.
Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Bottinelli, the undersigned must reject the petitioner's claim that he has been wrongly denied the immediate benefit of the First Step Act's amendment to the method for calculating goodtime credit. That amendment does not become effective until the establishment of the required “risks and needs assessment system” by the Attorney General. Bottinelli, [929 F.3d at 1202].
Accordingly, no rights of petitioner's have been violated and the petition must be dismissed [denied for lack of merit].

US v. Pratt, 2019 WL 3229617 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2019) (Claire, M.J.), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 3769079 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019) (Shubb, J.); see also U.S. v. Turnquist, 773 Fed.Appx. 413 (9th Cir. 2019) (following Bottinelli to affirm denial of section 2241 claims predicated on amendment to FSA's goodtime credit provision).[1]

         A federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that are not yet ripe, and “it would be improper for the court to take any action on the unripe claims”, Harbor Lands LP v. City of Blaine, Washington, 2008 WL 5130049, *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2008) (Richard Jones, J.), [2] yet the Ninth Circuit had no problem adjudicating this same habeas claim on the merits in Bottinelli v. Salazar, 929 F.3d 1196');">929 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2019) (i.e., the claim that the BOP violates a federal prisoner's Equal Protection and Due Process rights by refusing to apply the goodtime-credit amendment on its enactment date rather than the later date when the U.S. Attorney General issues assessment guidelines or was due to issue such guidelines).

         Accordingly, the Bottinelli panel necessarily implicitly determined that the claim was ripe, because otherwise the panel could not have decided the merits. See Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 113 F.Supp.3d 1113, 1123 (D. Colo. 2015) (“Although the . . . Circuit's opinion did not state that Count 3 constituted an actual case or controversy, the . . . Circuit decided Count 3 on the merits. It could not have reached the merits without first assuring itself of its own jurisdiction. Thus, because the . . . Circuit reached the merits of Count 3, it implicitly decided that Count 3 was ripe for judicial resolution.”) (citing Cunningham v. BHP Petroleum Great Britain PLC, 427 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added), aff'd, 840 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2016). The Court discerns no basis on which to distinguish the Bottinelli case legally or factually from our case so as to render it inapplicable here, so Bottinelli is precedentially binding.

         This means that the Court cannot adopt the R&R's conclusion that this FSA good-time amendment claim is not ripe. Instead of dismissing this habeas claim merely without prejudice due to unripeness, Bottinelli requires the Court to deny ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.