Superior Court of California, Appellate Division, Los Angeles
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
Central Trial Court No. 0SJ2058, Michael C. Small, Judge.
C. Wickham, County Counsel, Ruben Baeza, Jr., Assistant
County Counsel, and David D. Lee, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Office of John Rorabaugh, John Rorabaugh and Crystal L.
Rorabaugh for Defendant and Respondent.
criminal defendant's bail bond is forfeited, and the
statutory time to secure a defendant's attendance has
expired without the forfeiture being set aside, the court may
enter summary judgment “within 90 days after the date
upon which it may first be entered“ (Pen. Code, §
1306, subd. (c)). We hold that the only plausible reason for
including the qualifying language “may be
entered” is to ensure that the 90-day clock commences
on the first subsequent day that the court is open for
People of the State of California appeal the trial
court's order vacating the summary judgment entered on a
bail bond posted by an agent of Financial Casualty and
Surety, Inc. (Financial Casualty). The People maintain the
court erred in finding summary judgment on the bond was
entered after expiration of the 90-day period specified in
section 1306, subdivision (c). As discussed below, we agree
April 27, 2012, a defendant pled no contest to the charge of
burglary and was placed on summary probation on several terms
and conditions. When she failed to appear in court for a
probation violation hearing, a $5, 000 bench warrant was
issued. Bail Hotline Bail Bonds, acting as Financial
Casualty's agent, posted the bond for defendant's
release from custody. The defendant again failed to appear.
The court ordered the bond to be forfeited and the clerk
mailed notice of forfeiture on March 22, 2016.
September 22, 2016, Financial Casualty filed a motion to
extend the 180-day section 1305, subdivision (c)(1),
appearance period, and on October 21, 2016, the court granted
an extension “until (and including) 03/22/17.” On
June 16, 2017, pursuant to section 1305.4, the court extended
the period for an additional 28 days “until (and
including) July 14, 2017.” The critical event
underlying this appeal occurred on October 16, when the court
entered summary judgment on the bond.
Casualty filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment,
pursuant to section 1306, subdivision (c), which provides, if
“summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after
the date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do
so expires and the bail is exonerated.” Financial
Casualty noted the date upon which summary judgment
“may first be entered” in this case was July 15
(the next calendar day after the end of the extension
period); 90 days from that date was October 13; and summary
judgment was entered on October 16, a day which was more than
90 days after July 15.
People opposed the motion, arguing that, since July 15 was a
Saturday, the court could not have entered summary judgment
on that date, and the 90-day period began to run on Monday,
July 17. The People maintained that 90 days from July 17
(October 14) was also a Saturday, and that Code of Civil
Procedure section 12a, subdivision (a), extended the period
to Monday, October 16, the date the court entered summary
court conducted a hearing and granted Financial
Casualty's motion. The court concluded “the 90-day
period is absolute, beginning with the day after the
appearance period expires” regardless whether the court
is open on the date following the appearance period. The