United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND 
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11, 2017, Plaintiffs Salvador Magana and Laura Magana
(“Plaintiffs”) filed this personal injury action
in the Superior Court of California for the County of
Ventura. (Notice of Removal Ex. A (“Compl.”), ECF
No. 1-1.) Prior to the current defendants appearing,
Defendant Sandvik, Inc.,  (“Sandvik”) removed this
matter based on federal diversity jurisdiction. (See
Notice of Removal ¶¶ 9, 13, 17, ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiffs move to remand. (Mot. to Remand
(“Mot.”), ECF No. 27.) For the reasons that
follow, the Court GRANTS Magana's Motion and REMANDS this
action to state court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
13, 2015, Plaintiff Salvador Magana worked as a laborer for
Santa Paula Materials, Inc. (“Santa Paula”).
(Decl. of William M. Grewe (“Grewe Decl.”) ¶
2, ECF No. 27-1.) Plaintiff Laura Magana is the lawful spouse
of Plaintiff Salvador Magana. (Second Am. Compl.
(“SAC”) ¶ 16, ECF No. 25.) Mr. Magana used
an “S5 Screener” machine to process rocks and
materials. (SAC ¶ 2.) The machine caught his arm, pulled
his arm into the machine, and severed his arm from his body.
11, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Mr.
Magana's employer, Santa Paula Materials, Inc., in the
Superior Court of California for the County of Ventura,
asserting claims for negligence, strict product liability,
failure to warn, breach of warranty, and loss of consortium
claims. (SAC.) Upon learning that Santa Paula was not liable
for the injury, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal.
November 26, 2018, the Department of Occupational Safety and
Health informed Plaintiffs that Extec, Inc.
(“Extec”) manufactured, distributed, packaged,
labeled, and warranted the subject S5 Screener. (SAC ¶
3.) Plaintiffs believe that the S5 Screener was manufactured
by Extec sometime in 2006 and subsequently sold or
distributed to Santa Paula. (Mot. 3.) In 2007, a Sandvik
entity acquired and merged with Extec. (Mot. 3.) In 2009,
Extec filed a Certification of Surrender of Right to Transact
Intrastate Business with the California Secretary of State.
(Grewe Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 9.)
December 18, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended
Complaint in state court adding a theory of successor
liability. (Grewe Decl. ¶ 13.) On December 28, 2018,
Plaintiffs filed a DOE Amendment naming Sandvik as Defendant
DOE 1. (Grewe Decl. ¶ 14.) On January 30, 2019, Sandvik,
removed this matter to federal court based on federal
diversity jurisdiction because (1) Sandvik is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New
Jersey; (2) Plaintiffs are citizens of California; and (3)
the amount in controversy exceeded $75, 000. (Mot. 6.)
response to a Motion to Dismiss filed by Sandvik, Inc., the
parties met and conferred. (Grewe Decl. ¶ 18.)
Plaintiffs learned Extec merged with Sandvik Mining
(“Sandvik Mining”) in 2009. (Mot. 8.)
Additionally, Plaintiffs also learned that Santa Paula
obtained the S5 Screener from United Screening and Crushing,
Inc. (“United Screening”). (Id.) United
Screening is a California corporation with its principal
place of business in California. (Id.) After
informal discovery and discussion with Sandvik's
attorney, Plaintiffs learned Sandvik was not a proper
defendant and dismissed Sandvik from the matter.
March 28, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint
naming Sandvik Mining and Construction USA, LLC; United
Screening and Crushing, Inc.; and Extec, Inc. as Defendants.
(Mot.) Plaintiffs now moves to remand on the basis that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Mot.)
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having
subject-matter jurisdiction only over matters authorized by
the Constitution and Congress. See e.g., U.S. Const.
Art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in
state court may be removed to federal court only if the
federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the
suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original
jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law,
id. § 1331, or where each plaintiff's
citizenship is diverse from each defendant's citizenship
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, id.
strictly construe the removal statute against removal
jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566
(9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Therefore, “federal
jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the
right of removal in the first instance.” Id.
This “strong presumption” against removal demands
that a court resolve all ambiguity in favor of remand to
state court. Id. (quoting Nishimoto v.
Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3
(9th Cir. 1990)); see Matheson v. Progressive Specialty
Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Where doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a
case should be remanded to state court.”).
may be ordered for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for
“any defect in removal procedure.” 28 U.S.C
§ 1447(c). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised “at any time before final judgement.” 28
U.S.C § 1447(c). If at any time before a final judgment
it appears that the district court lacks subject matter