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Tran v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC

United States District Court, C.D. California

August 29, 2019

PAUL PHAT TRAN et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC et al., Defendants.

          ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS [19], [28]

          OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         I. INTRODUCTION

         Plaintiffs Paul Phat Tran and Tina Tran bring this action against Defendants Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Bayview”), JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”), and Trustee Corp. for various claims based on an alleged attempt of an unlawful non-judicial foreclosure of Plaintiffs' real property located at 21274 Nisqually Road, Apple Valley, California 92308 (the “Property”). (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 2, 10, ECF No. 17.) Bayview and Chase, separately, move to dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. (See Chase's Mot. to Dismiss (“Chase MTD”), ECF No. 19; Bayview's Mot. to Dismiss (“Bayview MTD”), ECF No. 28.) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Chase's and Bayview's Motions to Dismiss.[1]

         II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

         Around November 19, 2010, Ms. Tran obtained a loan from Home Funding Corp. secured by a deed of trust that encumbered the Property.[2] (Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 1, ECF No. 29.) Around March 31, 2017, Ms. Tran transferred the Property to Mr. Tran for no consideration. (FAC ¶ 8.)

         Bayview is the current loan servicer, while Chase was the previous loan servicer. (FAC ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiffs allege that, on August 21, 2018, Defendant Trustee Corp. recorded a notice of default based on Ms. Tran's failure to make her loan payments. (FAC ¶ 9; Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 5.)

         As to Chase, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Tran has a checking account with Chase, that a “direct withdraw[al] was happening from his Chase checking account to the lender, ” and that “Chase wrongfully stopped sending his direct payments to the lender.” (FAC ¶¶ 16-17.)

         As to Bayview, Plaintiffs allege that Bayview charged Plaintiffs for homeowner's insurance and unpaid property taxes despite Plaintiffs having homeowner's insurance and having paid their property taxes. (FAC ¶¶ 11-13.) As such, Plaintiffs allege that Bayview continued to “claim money for payments already received.” (FAC ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs identify five causes of action against all defendants: (1) breach of contract; (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) violation of California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500; and (6) declaratory relief. (FAC ¶¶ 19-59.)

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)-a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee, 250 F.3d at 679. However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, but a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). A court may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). A liberal reading cannot cure the absence of such facts. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

         Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly denied . . . if amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011).

         IV. DISCUSSION

         A. Defendants' ...


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