United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Paul Phat Tran and Tina Tran bring this action against
Defendants Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
(“Bayview”), JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(“Chase”), and Trustee Corp. for various claims
based on an alleged attempt of an unlawful non-judicial
foreclosure of Plaintiffs' real property located at 21274
Nisqually Road, Apple Valley, California 92308 (the
“Property”). (First Am. Compl.
(“FAC”) ¶¶ 2, 10, ECF No. 17.) Bayview
and Chase, separately, move to dismiss Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint. (See Chase's Mot. to Dismiss
(“Chase MTD”), ECF No. 19; Bayview's Mot. to
Dismiss (“Bayview MTD”), ECF No. 28.) For the
reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Chase's and
Bayview's Motions to Dismiss.
November 19, 2010, Ms. Tran obtained a loan from Home Funding
Corp. secured by a deed of trust that encumbered the
Property. (Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 1, ECF No.
29.) Around March 31, 2017, Ms. Tran transferred the Property
to Mr. Tran for no consideration. (FAC ¶ 8.)
is the current loan servicer, while Chase was the previous
loan servicer. (FAC ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiffs allege
that, on August 21, 2018, Defendant Trustee Corp. recorded a
notice of default based on Ms. Tran's failure to make her
loan payments. (FAC ¶ 9; Req. for Judicial Notice Ex.
Chase, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Tran has a checking account
with Chase, that a “direct withdraw[al] was happening
from his Chase checking account to the lender, ” and
that “Chase wrongfully stopped sending his direct
payments to the lender.” (FAC ¶¶ 16-17.)
Bayview, Plaintiffs allege that Bayview charged Plaintiffs
for homeowner's insurance and unpaid property taxes
despite Plaintiffs having homeowner's insurance and
having paid their property taxes. (FAC ¶¶ 11-13.)
As such, Plaintiffs allege that Bayview continued to
“claim money for payments already received.” (FAC
¶ 14.) Plaintiffs identify five causes of action against
all defendants: (1) breach of contract; (2) negligent
infliction of emotional distress; (3) breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing; (4) violation of California
Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500; and
(6) declaratory relief. (FAC ¶¶ 19-59.)
may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a
cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to
support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1988). To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need
only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule
8(a)(2)-a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter
v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual
“allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
determination of whether a complaint satisfies the
plausibility standard is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A
court must construe all “factual allegations set forth
in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most
favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee, 250 F.3d at 679.
However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable
inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266
F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Pro se pleadings are to be
construed liberally, but a plaintiff must still present
factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
341 (9th Cir. 2010). A court may not “supply essential
elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”
Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).
A liberal reading cannot cure the absence of such facts. Ivey
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should
generally provide leave to amend unless it is clear the
complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
Leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines
that the allegation of other facts consistent with the
challenged pleading could not possibly cure the
deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
Thus, leave to amend “is properly denied . . . if
amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City and
Cty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir.